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		<title>Confident Code for Confident People: How Do You Know What&#8217;s Running In Your Environment?</title>
		<link>https://rantcommunity.com/resources/confident-code-for-confident-people-how-do-you-know-whats-running-in-your-environment/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Galena]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 10:06:19 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Resources]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ReversingLabs]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://rantcommunity.com/?p=3356</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>There&#8217;s never a bad time for a RANT roundtable, but certainly, gathering together a group of highly experienced security leaders</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://rantcommunity.com/resources/confident-code-for-confident-people-how-do-you-know-whats-running-in-your-environment/">Confident Code for Confident People: How Do You Know What&#8217;s Running In Your Environment?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://rantcommunity.com">RANT Community</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There&#8217;s never a bad time for a RANT roundtable, but certainly, gathering together a group of highly experienced security leaders in the days following the announcement of the PHP2Shell vulnerabilities did rather imply that this one may be tricky to keep on topic. Fortuitously, the theme selected weeks previously proved entirely apt. But an entertaining early accident &#8211; when the venue staff ushered in a latecomer who sat at one of the two empty places at the table, wondering why they couldn&#8217;t find their name on any of the place settings, only to belatedly realise they&#8217;d been brought into the wrong private dining room &#8211; inadvertently helped keep minds focused on the task in hand.</p>
<p>How can businesses be sure that they&#8217;re not allowing third-party software to create ways through their security that they don&#8217;t know about? What steps can the modern business take to close loopholes attackers could exploit in code bases they not only have no control over, but may not even realise are deployed in their environments, because they&#8217;re there as part of a solution supplied by a third party under a different brand name? And, of course &#8211; when something goes wrong (because it&#8217;s always &#8220;when&#8221; these days, not &#8220;if&#8221;), who&#8217;s legally and financially responsible?</p>
<blockquote><p> &#8220;I&#8217;ve been in cybersecurity for three decades, going back to the days of anti-virus,&#8221; Matt Gyde, chief revenue officer of event hosts ReversingLabs, said in his scene-setting opening remarks. &#8220;Then we evolved into perimeter defence, firewalls, blocking; then went to defence-in-depth, and then to zero-trust, and authenticating everything. But in that whole time, no-one&#8217;s looked at software differently. With the SolarWinds incident, the compiler was compromised, so people could use the platform to compromise organisations. PHP is similar. Interesting things continue to happen. So that&#8217;s why we&#8217;re talking tonight about whether the software you buy is safe to deploy and ready to go.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>It was, of course, a massive topic, and needed some expert direction. RANT&#8217;s guest host for the evening, Adam Le Tissier &#8211; UK-based vice-president for cyber resilience and incident response at the Japanese investment bank Nomura &#8211; suggested some priorities for the ensuing hour&#8217;s conflab.</p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;At the code level, what regulations do suppliers have to secure their code to &#8211; and what are they doing to secure it?&#8221; he began. &#8220;Today we&#8217;re seeing a lot of threats that aren&#8217;t targeting organisations directly, and to some extent we&#8217;re all third parties. So we need to know how secure are those supply chains? And, if you bring this stuff in house, it&#8217;s about looking at your own code, and how you manage those same issues. Is this policy driven, or is this security driven? These are the questions we need to look at.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<h4><strong>Try Your Luck</strong></h4>
<p>First, some context. Why are we all in this mess to start with? And how bad is it, really?</p>
<p>One thing the PHP disclosure had brought home to many &#8211; and, it was noted, by no means just to cybersecurity specialists &#8211; is the nature of the modern enterprise&#8217;s software estate. A product is selected from among competitive tenders solicited following a rigorous and diligent requirement-drafting process, and is deployed in the environment as a single, standalone, coherent tool. Yet chances are that significant chunks of the code that run it are third-party off-the-shelf products folded in to perform specific functions.</p>
<p>That&#8217;s fine, so long as everyone knows about it &#8211; customer and vendor alike. But problems start to arise the longer-established &#8211; and therefore the more successful, and more widely used &#8211; a suppliers&#8217; product is. And when the product is not just part of the general functionality of the buyers&#8217; network, but has been bought to fulfil critical security tasks, the problems become more pronounced.</p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;If you look at long-term security vendors, they&#8217;ve had nine generations of developers come through, so we&#8217;re abstracted now from the original source code,&#8221; Gyde said. &#8220;That abstraction layer is creating even more problems with the supply chain because we don&#8217;t know what was originally there.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>Having a rigorous due-diligence process in place is essential, Le Tissier argued.</p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;Especially when using AI,&#8221; he added. &#8220;What are they doing with it, and what controls are in place? Also, there may well be code sitting there that developers are building on top of &#8211; and maybe there&#8217;s passwords in there, and&#8230;&#8221; He tailed off, a rueful smile hinting at the potential for exasperation that quickly attends any such attempt to find out what code &#8211; and therefore what vulnerabilities &#8211; may be hiding somewhere inside the enterprise.</p></blockquote>
<p>Gyde noted that this was exactly the problem that the PHP disclosure had laid bare. Some organisations were using versions of the software that were 10 or 12 years old, and are no longer being supported. To make matters worse, he added, even if a diligent customer organisation can persuade a vendor to give them a bill of materials, that will only tell the customer what the supplier knows is inside its code base. Little wonder that security leaders have limited &#8211; if any &#8211; confidence in the information that is supplied.</p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;You ask them about what&#8217;s in the code base, and what they do down in their supply chain,&#8221; one CISO sighed. &#8220;But deep down you know there&#8217;s a lot of&#8230;&#8221; They paused, thinking carefully about their next words. &#8220;&#8216;Lies&#8217; is too strong a word,&#8221; they eventually decided. &#8220;But let&#8217;s call it what it is: a strategy of hope.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<h4><strong>Control</strong></h4>
<p>ReversingLabs&#8217; approach is to scan binaries, ensuring that organisations can examine the code they rely on at its component level, irrespective of how it&#8217;s badged or identified. This gets around the problem of a supplier failing to disclose (or perhaps not even realising) what earlier software their product incorporates. The firm&#8217;s products can scan PHP, among innumerable software products and formats. This will help surface any areas of concern &#8211; but it is not a solution in and of itself.</p>
<p>Take, for example, the situation laid out by one security leader, whose enterprise relies on Microsoft products. Their concern wasn&#8217;t so much with finding new vulnerabilities, but over how they, as an entity, can demonstrate &#8211; internally, to the board; externally, to regulators and major customers &#8211; that their systems can be relied upon.</p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;It&#8217;s so hard at the moment,&#8221; they said. &#8220;Microsoft say they can do this, but we get sent loads of patches every month.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;The way I look at it is to treat all software as untrusted,&#8221; another CISO said. &#8220;So to me, it all comes down to zero trust, particularly in the post-Mythos era. Everything has vulnerabilities, so I&#8217;m going to limit access to it all. How,&#8221; they then asked, politedly but pointedly, &#8220;can ReversingLabs give me so much confidence that I no longer need to do that?&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;We can discover things based on the code the machine is reading,&#8221; Gyde said. &#8220;When you talk about agentic software, we&#8217;re actually selling more to machines today than to humans. We have about 422 billion items of goodware and badware [that the system recognises].&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;So, you can show that everything across my environment is riddled with vulnerabilities&#8230;&#8221; suggested another security leader, with a somewhat mischievous look on their face.</p>
<p>&#8220;We&#8217;ll say you&#8217;ve got problems, for sure,&#8221; Gyde said, acknowledging the friendly jab. &#8220;We&#8217;re not saying zero trust isn&#8217;t a model you should follow. But we can give you visibility to enable you to make controls for that software. &#8216;You&#8217;re running version 2.0.1, but if you swap it for 2.0.3, that&#8217;ll solve your problem&#8217; &#8211; we can give you that kind of visibility. We can give you the detail: it&#8217;s up to you how you action it.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<h4><strong>Break It Bought It</strong></h4>
<p>Another line of questioning arose at this point. How, if at all, has &#8220;the marketing campaign called Mythos&#8221; affected potential customers&#8217; views of ReversingLabs, one CISO asked. Their phrasing &#8211; greeted with wry chuckles around the table &#8211; reflected the widespread view that much of the hair-on-fire hysteria surrounding generative so-called AI systems&#8217; supposed ability to find flaws in deployed software is less a realistic response to game-changing new defensive capabilities, and more a return to the bad old days of FUD (fear, uncertainty, doubt) which was the cornerstone of the PR pitches from a raft of companies &#8211; many no longer in business &#8211; who would happily try to flog their spiffily-presented but only partially effective security tools by trying to generate panic among their customer base. Are companies &#8211; this CISO wanted to know &#8211; saying, &#8220;I don&#8217;t need ReversingLabs, because Mythos will find all the vulnerabilities?&#8221;</p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;We&#8217;ve got an organisation we work with &#8211; they&#8217;re more into tick-box compliance &#8211; that are saying, &#8216;Mythos can solve all our problems&#8217;. Those are hard discussions to have,&#8221; Gyde admitted. &#8220;I don&#8217;t see Mythos as a security product,&#8221; he continued. &#8220;We add a tremendous amount of context, and we can provide the verdict to the AI. Personally, I think it&#8217;s a boon for us. We don&#8217;t really care about what [security or discovery tools] you&#8217;re putting in &#8211; we&#8217;re more concerned about the context.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>Have any customers &#8211; particularly end-user entities as opposed to code suppliers &#8211; mandated their software vendors to use ReversingLabs, another CISO asked.</p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;One big financial organisation based in the U.S. is doing exactly that,&#8221; Gyde said. &#8220;They say to the vendor, &#8216;Either I&#8217;m going to scan it, or you can do it before&#8217;.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>A couple of leaders around the table noted that you&#8217;d have to be a pretty big customer to have sufficient leverage to force any supplier into this &#8211; while accepting that a significantly sized bank would probably fit that bill. So it won&#8217;t help everyone, though might be a useful tactic for some. Still, another CISO noted, insisting a supplier scanned the code before shipping it would only help if both customer and vendor were in perfect alignment over what needed to be checked for, and what constituted an acceptable result. Again, the concept seems sound, but detailed customer context is all-important. Or, as one leader put it, if you&#8217;re trusting a third party to give you assurance, &#8220;how do you have confidence in your confidence?&#8221;</p>
<h4><strong>Who Knows What You&#8217;ll Find?</strong></h4>
<p>The final segment of the discussion coupled key themes explored earlier with questions around accountability, responsibility and regulatory approval. While there may only be some customer organisations who are covered by statutory regulation, all organisations of any size whatsoever have to reckon with broader regulatory responsibilities. While a bank or a power supplier will be accountable to regulators with significant audit powers, even a one-person business selling stuff through a website and working from home will have to comply with the General Data Protection Regulation. If the PHP furore has done anything here, it&#8217;s perhaps helped to get the message across that cybersecurity isn&#8217;t just something that big firms with temptingly large financial resources and customer databases need to worry about.</p>
<blockquote><p> &#8220;My wife rang me in a panic over PHP, saying &#8216;I need to do something about my website&#8217;,&#8221; one security leader said. &#8220;The response to this from the non-cybersecurity world has been orders of magnitude greater [than to previous high-profile cybersecurity stories]. We have to take that as a win: the world has moved on from, &#8216;I&#8217;m too small, who&#8217;s going to hack me?'&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;Most of our exposure to it was in other software,&#8221; another leader acknowledged.</p>
<p>&#8220;It&#8217;s similar to SSL libraries,&#8221; said another. &#8220;It&#8217;s critical software, but the vendor has no interest in updating it&#8230;&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;&#8230;or the vendor no longer exists,&#8221; a fourth added.</p>
<p>&#8220;When the auditor shows up, they&#8217;re always asking, &#8216;Have you gone into the libraries, and further down?'&#8221; another CISO noted.</p>
<p>&#8220;I completely agree,&#8221; said another. &#8220;People either hide it, or say it doesn&#8217;t exist until it becomes an issue.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>Regulators and auditors, of course, are unlikely to look particularly kindly on situations such as this. Business leaders may have legitimate reasons not to go poking around at the binary level and finding vulnerabilities that they didn&#8217;t otherwise know that they had if they&#8217;re about to head into a series of conversations with regulators. But dealing with them need not be an entirely adversarial process, one CISO suggested. Also, they argued, the kinds of interactions and conversations organisations have with regulators will be different in nuance and scope to those they have with auditors.</p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;Regulators need assurance that you understand your risks and are managing them properly, and to know what you&#8217;re deploying in your environment; auditors check that you&#8217;re doing it all &#8211; &#8216;You have this policy, are you following it?'&#8221; they said. &#8220;That means conversations with regulators and auditors are different. But those conversations are not changing.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;It&#8217;s also about making sure people understand it&#8217;s just one part of the security posture,&#8221; another CISO added. &#8220;It&#8217;s too easy to get diverted by the elephant in the room and miss the little mouse that goes and chews through the cables. The problem is that you&#8217;ll find something if you go looking for it.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>The post <a href="https://rantcommunity.com/resources/confident-code-for-confident-people-how-do-you-know-whats-running-in-your-environment/">Confident Code for Confident People: How Do You Know What&#8217;s Running In Your Environment?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://rantcommunity.com">RANT Community</a>.</p>
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		<title>AI Agents Are the Ultimate Insiders?</title>
		<link>https://rantcommunity.com/resources/ai-agents-are-the-ultimate-insiders/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Galena]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 08:04:51 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Resources]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mimecast]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://rantcommunity.com/?p=3352</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Could the machines rise up and attack us, or just cause an insider-like incident? In a recent Forum, sponsored by</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://rantcommunity.com/resources/ai-agents-are-the-ultimate-insiders/">AI Agents Are the Ultimate Insiders?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://rantcommunity.com">RANT Community</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Could the machines rise up and attack us, or just cause an insider-like incident? In a recent Forum, sponsored by Mimecast, the point under discussion was whether insider risk programmes were built on one assumption: that the insider is a person.</p>
<p>However has that assumption broken because of incidents such as <a href="https://www.computerweekly.com/news/366646245/Did-an-AI-agent-really-break-free-and-attack-another-company">Hugging Face</a>? In that case a company was attacked but not by a person, but an AI. The AI agent isn&#8217;t a tool that insider uses anymore, it is a business element &#8211;  an invisible workforce acting on your team&#8217;s behalf, with privileged access, moving at a speed no human ever moved at.</p>
<p>Gartner <a href="https://www.dtex.ai/blog/key-takeaways-from-the-gartner-market-guide-for-insider-risk-management/">has told security leaders</a> to treat insider risk as human risk; but no one has written the version for what is acting on your employee&#8217;s behalf. So, how many agents are running in your environment right now, and what can it touch and impact?</p>
<h4><strong>Enterprises Struggling?</strong></h4>
<p>Chaired by Rob Black, the panel included a CISO, head of cyber at a defence organisation, and the field CTO EMEA. The discussion began with an acknowledgement that many enterprises already struggle with identity management, often relying on a persona-based view of users. Applying the same approach to AI agents risks overlooking the differences between human behaviour and technology designed to complete tasks autonomously.</p>
<p>One panellist argued that treating humans and agents as equivalent identities offers practical benefits, allowing organisations to build on existing identity platforms and workflows. However, this approach does not necessarily provide sufficient insight into the actions agents take on behalf of people.</p>
<p>Another panellist distinguished between insider risk, which traditionally centres on human behaviour and intent, and the technical controls needed to govern autonomous systems. While the two areas overlap, understanding what an agent is doing, what it has been instructed to do and what a human is doing independently remains difficult.</p>
<p>The discussion highlighted the importance of context. AI agents are generally motivated by completing their assigned tasks, potentially continuing until they encounter a guardrail. Understanding that motivation, alongside the permissions and information available to an agent, is essential to determining whether its actions represent a genuine security risk.</p>
<p>However, panellists questioned whether suspicious scripts or autonomous processes should automatically fall within an organisation&#8217;s insider risk strategy, suggesting some cases may be better addressed through threat detection and technical security controls.</p>
<h4><strong>How Much Does Incident Response Count?</strong></h4>
<p>Despite the differences between people and AI systems, incident response may not need to distinguish between them when determining the impact of an event. Whether an incident results from human activity or an autonomous agent, organisations still need to understand what happened, assess the damage and establish how to prevent a recurrence.</p>
<p>One panellist argued that organisations must consider who is responsible for an agent&#8217;s actions, particularly where employees are permitted to create or deploy their own systems. Centralising accountability becomes difficult when agents operate across different teams and workflows.</p>
<p>A theme of monitoring was also prevent, as this can help establish a record of activity. One approach discussed was technology that records information entered into AI tools and allows organisations to search those records, helping reconstruct how an output was generated and what information contributed to it.</p>
<h4><strong>Visibility is Not Enough?</strong></h4>
<p>Visibility alone is insufficient: organisations need appropriate infrastructure, access controls and guardrails to govern agents without undermining the productivity gains that make adoption attractive. Overly restrictive controls risk preventing employees from realising the benefits of AI, while inadequate safeguards can expose sensitive information or allow agents to find unintended routes through existing systems.</p>
<p>The discussion also raised concerns about employees using AI tools to develop scripts and automate processes without sufficient training or governance. Panellists stressed that organisations must explain not only how employees can use AI, but also what they should avoid doing and how to work securely at speed.</p>
<p>Training and clear policies can help establish those boundaries. One panellist described introducing an AI policy developed with legal counsel, which helped increase adoption by giving employees clearer guidance on acceptable use.</p>
<h4><strong>Make Governance Compatible</strong></h4>
<p>The challenge for security leaders is to make governance compatible with business demand. Panellists described approaches that linked access to privileges and token allowances, gradually extending permissions as users demonstrated readiness. Training and approval processes could then provide access to more autonomous capabilities.</p>
<p>Communicating the risks to executives also requires a broader understanding of business priorities. One contributor argued that security professionals gain credibility by engaging with boards and committees, learning how the organisation operates and contributing ideas beyond security itself.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the panel suggested that AI agents are neither simply human users nor entirely separate from insider risk. Organisations must understand their behaviour, constrain their access and establish accountability for their use.</p>
<h4><strong>Closing Comments</strong></h4>
<p>As one panellist warned, AI systems can expose information in ways their users never anticipated. The technology may be designed to help, but its capacity to pursue tasks relentlessly makes effective oversight essential.</p>
<p>The CISO said there will be convergence of human and non on how work with this, but there is a need to fight and debate it, and that is the only way we will learn to cause rapid change.</p>
<p>Another panelist said that a wild ride is ahead, which they were not looking forward to, but they came into the room thinking insider risks just apply to humans, and the AI vector is related to human activity.</p>
<p>Finally the field CTO said the debate has been robust, and this is an evolving space and whether you’re looking at a human or AI insider risk, you need events that you understand, and know what your peers are doing to help guide you in your explaining to the board what happened and why.</p>
<p>Rob Black concluded by saying that whilst we’re at a cutting edge point, AI will find a way to succeed and now we’re at a position where we can manage it..</p>
<h4>Mimecast secures humans, data &amp; AI to protect your work. To learn more, head to <a href="https://www.workprotected.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">www.workprotected.com</a></h4>
<p>The post <a href="https://rantcommunity.com/resources/ai-agents-are-the-ultimate-insiders/">AI Agents Are the Ultimate Insiders?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://rantcommunity.com">RANT Community</a>.</p>
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		<title>From Recovery To Resilience: Lessons From An Incident Response Leader</title>
		<link>https://rantcommunity.com/resources/from-recovery-to-resilience-lessons-from-an-incident-response-leader/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lexi Walker]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2026 13:08:26 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Resources]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Halcyon]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://rantcommunity.com/?p=3296</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>We take great care at RANT to try to preserve the sanctity of the confessional while making sure that as</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://rantcommunity.com/resources/from-recovery-to-resilience-lessons-from-an-incident-response-leader/">From Recovery To Resilience: Lessons From An Incident Response Leader</a> appeared first on <a href="https://rantcommunity.com">RANT Community</a>.</p>
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<div class="zw-line-div">We take great care at RANT to try to preserve the sanctity of the confessional while making sure that as many members of the community as possible can benefit from the hard-won insights shared by attendees at our events. So when summarising discussions, we scrupulously adhere to the Chatham House Rule, making sure we don&#8217;t identify anyone speaking, apart from sponsors. The value of that approach was brought home at a recent event, held in conjunction with cyber-resiliency specialists Halcyon, where a highly experienced security leader agreed to discuss lessons on responding to major cyber incidents. The following precis focuses on those lessons rather than on any specific incident. The leader believes that experience gained in responding to major incidents needs to be shared: it is only by being open about the challenges that the security industry, collectively, can hope to learn anything that might help improve responses to future incidents.</div>
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<h4 class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-textformat="{&quot;fw&quot;:&quot;bold&quot;,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;text&quot;}" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true"><strong>First Moves</strong></h4>
<p class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true">It is often the case that an incident will come out of the blue, and at an inconvenient time. And the first lesson to be learned, perhaps, is: when you&#8217;re interviewing potential new staff, if they seem particularly committed to their work, they might well prove to be the best people you&#8217;ll ever hire. The speed of an initial response can depend on colleagues who recognise that something is wrong and know how to escalate it quickly. Without them, you may not realise what is happening until it&#8217;s too late.</p>
<p class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true"> The early days of a major incident can be dominated by damage assessment and an all-hands-on-deck response, with the urgent priority of minimising the damage and limiting the downtime. Disruption to digital connections can affect both online services and physical operations. There will be particular difficulties responding when attackers have obtained privileged access. Activity undertaken with legitimate credentials can be harder to distinguish from authorised work, making the investigation and containment decisions more demanding. A wider point is that privileged access can allow an attacker to perform actions that the systems would ordinarily permit, so the existence of controls does not by itself guarantee that misuse will be detected.</p>
<p class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true">Ransomware can affect both operational systems and recovery resources. The effects can be significant.The discussion also highlighted the practical challenges of switching to manual processes. It isn’t enough to have a fallback: staff need to know how to use it, including colleagues who have only ever worked with the digital system.</p>
<h4 class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-textformat="{&quot;fw&quot;:&quot;bold&quot;,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;text&quot;}" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true"><strong>Building A Bridge</strong></h4>
<p class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true">Reliable internal communications are an immediate priority, including a bridge and a shared way to record updates. Even when this work is given appropriate early priority, none of this is a trivial endeavour. One key consideration will be the decision to go paperless inside a business, often taken for sound commercial and practical reasons. This speeds up internal and customer-facing processes, but recovery records must remain accessible when normal digital systems and backups are unavailable.</p>
<p class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true">Rebuilding a directory service is only one part of recovery. Deciding what comes next requires a shared view of priorities and dependencies. Without it, teams can find themselves chasing different objectives at an exhausting and stressful time. Reliance on digital systems brings another challenge, which becomes particularly apparent in the days immediately following an attack. Knowing a lot about individual products is different from understanding the services they are part of. As the security leader put it: &#8220;Unless you know where your connections are, you can’t say you’ve contained things.&#8221;</p>
<h4 class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-textformat="{&quot;fw&quot;:&quot;bold&quot;,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;text&quot;}" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true"><strong>Leaders And Leadership</strong></h4>
<p class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true">A challenge likely to be shared by staff across many different types of organisations is deciding who should lead the company during the response to an incident. Questions of responsibility and accountability, perhaps left pending during times when everything is going normally, will inevitably come to a head in the midst of a crisis. And answers arrived at in haste &#8211; as everyone tries their best to rescue an immediately desperate situation &#8211; may not always be the same ones that would have been taken after sober analysis under less pressure.</p>
<p class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true">During a major incident, the security team can find itself fielding questions about the whole organisation’s security position. Clear responsibilities and an accurate record of decisions help keep the response focused. There may be people who see a route to recovery that will work within their own division or business area, and who believe they should be able to pursue that at pace, because it will help the company get its services back up and running as soon as possible. There is obvious merit to elements of this argument, but there are also some fairly self-evident pitfalls associated with following through on it. And, without clear, agreed recovery procedures, there is a risk that ongoing security efforts will be undermined by well-intentioned people seeking to speed up the restart of the services they provide and rely on.</p>
<p class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true">The security leader&#8217;s advice was to agree who has authority during an incident before it happens. The business will understandably want services working again quickly, while the security response needs to contain the attack and establish that restoration can proceed safely. Those priorities need a common decision-making process, with clear security criteria for bringing systems back online.</p>
<h5 class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true">The effect on the people involved can be profound, and lasting.</h5>
<h5 class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true">The pressure on response teams can be exhausting.</h5>
<h5 class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true">There will be a clear requirement to provide embattled staff with some relief.</h5>
<h4 class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-textformat="{&quot;fw&quot;:&quot;bold&quot;,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;text&quot;}" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true"><strong>Bringing In Reinforcements</strong></h4>
<p class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true">In-house teams working extraordinary hours may need reinforcements to reduce the risk of burnout. Integrating that support is itself part of the response. Bringing in crisis-management experts can be reassuring for teams already under sustained pressure. But their arrival also means agreeing how their role fits with the existing response, and who is responsible for each decision.</p>
<p class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true">External teams may be used to working in a particular way, with a particular level of decision-making autonomy, and to a different kind of working relationship with in-house security staff. Their experience can be valuable, but the way they are deployed needs to support a coherent response.</p>
<p class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true">Advice on which risks to accept needs to reach senior decision-makers through an agreed process. Security expertise must remain part of those decisions, alongside the operational and commercial considerations. Experienced outside specialists with a clear remit can make a substantial difference to an exhausted in-house team, and the working relationships built during that period can last. Of course, this all comes at a cost. Insurance and retained support can form part of the preparation, but the most intensive level of external assistance cannot usually be kept on indefinitely. Longer-term recovery needs its own resourcing plan. Keeping track of names, time and costs, and writing things down from the point external support is engaged, helps ensure that senior leadership has an accurate account.</p>
<h4 class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-textformat="{&quot;fw&quot;:&quot;bold&quot;,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;text&quot;}" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true"><strong>How The Business Fits Together</strong></h4>
<p class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true">But perhaps the biggest learning-point from this leader&#8217;s perspective was the relationship between the way a business is structured and the way its services actually run. Organisational boundaries can create difficulties during an incident and its aftermath. A large organisation may have business units covering areas such as central services, finance, customer channels and operations. Its customer-facing services will often cross several of those boundaries.</p>
<p class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true">They offered a typical example: order fulfilment. An order comes from the website, stock and finance are checked, then it passes through distribution and warehouse systems before it can be shipped. Each part of this process may sit within a different business unit, but the customer experiences one service. Business units can have different priorities and measures of success. The challenge is to ensure that those differences do not obscure the dependencies between them. This can make bringing systems back online more complicated. The business needs to understand the risks at those interfaces and decide how they will be managed. The security leader described the value of documenting systems, mapping the services they support, and overlaying the risk information. Looking at each system separately gives one picture; tracing the process across business-unit boundaries can reveal dependencies that are otherwise easy to miss. The lesson is to align recovery and risk management across those services, as well as within individual business units. A better understanding of dependencies can help limit disruption and inform recovery decisions.</p>
<p class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true">Making that change requires more than a technically sound diagram. Leaders need a shared understanding of the problem, the responsibilities involved, and the practical implications for their own business areas. That is where leadership and co-operation become particularly important. Bringing people together around a common recovery objective helps teams move from separate priorities to a co-ordinated response. Clear sponsorship is also needed to carry the lessons into longer-term improvements. A fuller understanding of the digital interrelationships between different parts of the business gives teams a stronger basis for resilience planning. It also helps explain where departmental responsibilities need to connect, without assuming that a diagram alone will change how an organisation works.</p>
<p class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true">The aim is to turn the lessons into practical changes that make the business better prepared for future disruption.</p>
<h4 class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-textformat="{&quot;fw&quot;:&quot;bold&quot;,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;text&quot;}" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true"><strong>Looking To The Future</strong></h4>
<p class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true">Some lessons will depend on the organisation involved. Others apply to more or less any modern business. Above all, the security leader argued, ensuring corporate leadership is prepared for the decisions and competing priorities of a post-attack period can help make the response as prompt and effective as possible. The first recommendation was to have an agreement in place with the CEO about incident authority and the security conditions for recovery. Containment, eradication and restoration need to be co-ordinated, with clear criteria for moving between them.</p>
<blockquote>
<p class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true">&#8220;Second point,&#8221; they continued, &#8220;is, obviously, have a plan, get it written down, and really work it hard. And equal second: make sure you&#8217;ve written down what your systems look like.&#8221;</p>
</blockquote>
<p class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true">Ultimately, the lessons are perhaps not too surprising.</p>
<blockquote>
<p class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true">  &#8220;It&#8217;s all the things that we all know from however long we&#8217;ve been in the industry,&#8221; they said. &#8220;Look at the basics.&#8221;</p>
</blockquote>
<p class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true">The ability to do all this, one of the CISOs around the table suggested, will depend on the nature and strength of the relationships within the company, too. Implicit in their point was that the vital relationships are not just those between key senior individuals, but between teams and business units as well. The security leader fully agreed.</p>
<blockquote>
<p class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true">  &#8220;And you don&#8217;t build those relationships during an incident,&#8221; Halcyon&#8217;s enterprise account executive, Luke Kinder, said. &#8220;You build them early. If you do, that makes them more indestructible.&#8221;</p>
</blockquote>
<p class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true">Responding to a question about the early hours of an incident, the security leader made a serious point about the speed of containment decisions. Isolating a critical identity service may be an option during an incident, but it has significant operational consequences. The appropriate action depends on the attack and the environment. Preparing those decisions in advance, including who can authorise them, is more useful than assuming one action will suit every incident.</p>
<p class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true">The discussion also brought shared recognition of why this would be a particularly difficult decision for anyone to take. One CISO summed up the dilemma quite neatly.</p>
<blockquote>
<p class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true">&#8220;There&#8217;s a danger of if you act too hastily you cause damage &#8211; and if you act too slowly you cause damage,&#8221; they said.</p>
</blockquote>
<p class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true">Regardless, the challenge facing all organisations is becoming ever more starkly defined. As Kinder put it:</p>
<blockquote>
<p class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true">&#8220;I know it&#8217;s a cliche, but it&#8217;s not &#8216;if&#8217;, but &#8216;when&#8217;. That&#8217;s probably a fair assumption now.&#8221;</p>
</blockquote>
<p class="zw-paragraph" data-linerule="auto" data-line-height="1.1583333" data-margin-bottom="8.0pt" data-window-control-info="true">The security leader agreed.</p>
<blockquote><p><span class="zw-portion zw-text-portion" data-text-len="84">&#8220;I think, at some point, when the industry catches up, there&#8217;ll have to be a new approach of some sort, towards allowing things,&#8221; they said.</span></p>
<p><span class="zw-portion zw-text-portion" data-text-len="84"> &#8220;Rather than having a privileged user who can get into everything and drop what they like, everything has to be pre-approved. It&#8217;s only becoming more important with AI, because everything happens at lightning speed.&#8221;</span></p></blockquote>
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<p>The post <a href="https://rantcommunity.com/resources/from-recovery-to-resilience-lessons-from-an-incident-response-leader/">From Recovery To Resilience: Lessons From An Incident Response Leader</a> appeared first on <a href="https://rantcommunity.com">RANT Community</a>.</p>
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		<title>Time To Settle The Score: Why Your TPRM Strategy Needs More Than Questionnaires And Tick-Boxes</title>
		<link>https://rantcommunity.com/resources/time-to-settle-the-score-why-your-tprm-strategy-needs-more-than-questionnaires-and-tick-boxes/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Galena]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 09:15:21 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Resources]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Diligent]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://rantcommunity.com/?p=3240</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>It&#8217;s hardly a novel observation to suggest that we live in confusing and contrary times. Lots of things about our</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://rantcommunity.com/resources/time-to-settle-the-score-why-your-tprm-strategy-needs-more-than-questionnaires-and-tick-boxes/">Time To Settle The Score: Why Your TPRM Strategy Needs More Than Questionnaires And Tick-Boxes</a> appeared first on <a href="https://rantcommunity.com">RANT Community</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It&#8217;s hardly a novel observation to suggest that we live in confusing and contrary times. Lots of things about our present shared environments make very little sense, so singling any one tiny example out might seem pointless. But there is something emblematic of our socio-political-cultural moment in the strange way we all seem to react to questionnaires.</p>
<p>As consumers we appear to love them. As attention spans atrophy and an audience for traditional written &#8220;content&#8221; becomes ever harder for publishers to find, no online resource is going to struggle for clicks and eyeballs when it posts some kind of &#8220;what Pokémon character/domesticated animal/type of cheese/superhero&#8217;s sidekick are you?&#8221; quizlet. Everyone wants to have a go, regardless of whether there&#8217;s any kind of prize involved, and completely oblivious to small print that may say, by participating, we&#8217;re giving permission for 174 tracking services to monitor our web browsing activity for the next 100 years. But when it&#8217;s our job to fill in questionnaires sent by our suppliers or our customers, and quizzing us on our risk appetite, our security processes and policies, and on how safe and reliable a partner we may be in an ongoing and mutually beneficial business relationship, questionnaires seem to become the last thing anybody wants to have anything to do with.</p>
<p>And yet, according to many views expressed by a high-level group of CISOs, BISOs and other senior cybersecurity leaders called together by risk-management specialists Diligent for a RANT roundtable in Manchester, questionnaires remain the first and best option for many businesses when it comes to assessing and assuring the security of their usually extensive supply chains. But why is that? Surely there&#8217;s got to be something out there that works better, is more effective, more responsive, less arduous and should be more reliable a gauge of a partner&#8217;s security policies and practices than the much-decried and almost entirely unloved extended tick-box exercises that most businesses insist on their suppliers submitting to?</p>
<p>&#8220;My perspective on all this has grown over the years,&#8221; said RANT&#8217;s guest-host for the evening, Colin Farrell, currently head of security audit at the Office for National Statistics but who, in previous roles, has worked extensively in regulatory audit capacities and spent time on staff at the Information Commissioner&#8217;s Office. As such, his overview of supply-chain risk is extensive and his perspective broad. The trends he&#8217;s noticed are therefore noteworthy.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;The interesting thing about third-party risk management is that it&#8217;s the only aspect of security I can think of where everybody&#8217;s basically doing the same thing,&#8221; he said. &#8220;It&#8217;s different shades of grey &#8211; but everyone uses supplier questionnaires. They look a bit different, the processes are different, and I&#8217;m sure there are examples of industries this doesn&#8217;t apply to. But questionnaires exist for a reason &#8211; they work. So what interests me tonight is, what are those different methods? And has anyone found anything that works better?&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<h4><strong>Ready Or Not</strong></h4>
<p>The first theme to emerge from the discussion was that questionnaires, like any tool, work best when deployed with precision, care and planning, rather than reflexively reached for as a blunt solve-it-all-somehow instrument. And while some attendees flagged up exceptions, and some suggested a few ways of obtaining the necessary assurance that may not use questionnaires as the sole or central means of obtaining information, for most security and audit managers, the best way of making questionnaires work well lies in ensuring they&#8217;re sent out &#8211; and/or responded to &#8211; only after first asking and answering some simple, basic and internal questions.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;When you onboard a new supplier you need to understand the service they&#8217;re supplying &#8211; and you need to have an exit plan, because without one you can&#8217;t even onboard them,&#8221; one security leader argued. &#8220;To me, that&#8217;s proper risk management. It shouldn&#8217;t be, &#8216;Have you got this policy and that policy? Yeah? Then we&#8217;ll onboard you.&#8217; No. It&#8217;s not about a tick in a box.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;Not all suppliers are equal, are they?&#8221; another leader mused, pointing out that a firm that supplies pens to an office will not need to demonstrate the same kind of security assurance as a financial partner or a company whose systems are required to connect to the corporate network. &#8220;What we try to do,&#8221; they added, &#8220;is not ask everyone the same questions. There are screening questions, then what we ask after those is different.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>Very quickly, the conversation turned to not just understanding the nature of the relationship between the companies and appreciating the differences between different kinds of suppliers, but to means and methods of accurately and sensibly assessing risk in the round.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;What are the things on top that you need to do to understand what the true risk is?&#8221; one expert asked, partly rhetorically, partly genuinely and literally. &#8220;You need an external view of how controls are working, and you need that on a continuous basis. Then you&#8217;ve got to understand different suppliers depending on the risk they represent to you based on who they are and what they do for you. You should,&#8221; they added, &#8220;ask the same questions to all of them. [But] what do you want to get out of it? The questionnaire gives you something, but you need an assessment of what they&#8217;re actually doing.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<h4><strong>The Mask</strong></h4>
<p>At the end of the discussion, Diligent&#8217;s governance, risk and compliance sales director, Tom Ryan, humble-bragged that neither he nor his colleague, director of sales Chlōe Dellow, had mentioned AI once. But it wouldn&#8217;t be a cybersecurity conversation in 2026 without someone raising the spectre of autonomous agents, large-language models and generative so-called &#8220;artificial intelligence&#8221; &#8211; and, inevitably, this contentiously inescapable technology was evoked quite early in the evening. But for once, the impact it seems to be having &#8211; at least for some businesses &#8211; has been positive in terms of how it has redirected discussions within companies during examinations of supply-chain risk.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;AI has helped in this respect with us,&#8221; one attendee said, noting that their product is software, most of their suppliers supply software, and AI is contained within most of those supplied software products. &#8220;It has forced governance across the whole company. Now we&#8217;ve got people who are looking at the impact across the whole enterprise. Legal are doing a deeper dive on terms and conditions, and security is now a part of that process. We&#8217;re not driving it anymore &#8211; which is nice. There&#8217;s no escaping it, so it&#8217;s going through a more rigorous compliance process.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>But in other sectors &#8211; perhaps particularly those where the product or service being sold is not software &#8211; such deepened corporate understanding may be slower to coalesce. And, in any case, it will still be necessary to ask the right questions if anyone hopes to obtain answers that are accurate, insightful and reliable. Understanding the nature of the relationship remains fundamental and unavoidable.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;You&#8217;ve got to look at the non-standard supplier,&#8221; one security leader, who works in a regulated industry, said. &#8220;We have to break things down to: What companies am I mandated to use? What are the regulated companies I have to work with? And who is there outside of that who I still need to be on top of? It&#8217;s all about piecing that all together to get a fuller view. What risks are you willing to take? That&#8217;s not just cybersecurity risks &#8211; it&#8217;s all the other risks too.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<h4><strong>Freestyle Interlude</strong></h4>
<p>One of those other risks &#8211; unavoidably, if somewhat metatextually &#8211; lies in whether or not you can trust the responses you get from your questionnaires.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;Sometimes,&#8221; one CISO suggested, people give certain answers because &#8220;they want to keep the business on side. Whereas in your head you&#8217;re thinking, &#8216;This is complete BS, and if the regulator were to come along and look at this, we&#8217;d be screwed.&#8217; The biggest problem we see is people being able to explain to the business what the risk is, in language they understand. And what do you do next with all that information? You&#8217;ve got it, but often, it just drops down a hole.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>And of course, the questionnaire experience usually works in two directions, not just one: most firms, as well as attempting to ensure adequate and acceptable security policies are in place with suppliers, will be on the receiving end of similar approaches, responding to similar concerns, from the companies they supply their products and services to. Making sure the business can do that is just as important, and the theme of responses being coloured by the likely perceptions of the intended audience is resonant here too.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;I want to get away from the idea that [adhering to standards such as the ISO&#8217;s] 27001 is the minimum viable product,&#8221; one CISO said. &#8220;I try to underline how we sell ourselves to our customers. We have a competitor who got popped, and they have a similar name to our business, so we have to be able to explain why we&#8217;re better than that. That changes the model. At the moment, [most companies seem] to be keeping the barrier at, &#8216;What&#8217;s the bare minimum we expect?&#8217; We need to do better than that. And then we can change the model.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<h4><strong>Cowboys</strong></h4>
<p>Another set of tools that are widely used to help companies assess supply-chain risk are scorecards produced by companies who offer the chance to take up some of the burden of information-gathering for client firms, and put what is known about a supplier&#8217;s risk and compliance into a single, updated, easy-to-understand format. Most leaders in the room seemed to use scorecards, but few seemed particularly happy with what they were getting out of them. And the CISO at the firm who has a competitor with a similar business name was certainly not a fan.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;We get called after a competitor gets breached, because we&#8217;ve got a similar name &#8211; and then we get scores that aren&#8217;t for us, because the [scorecard vendors] are following the wrong firm,&#8221; they said. &#8220;It puts us at risk. We have people who say that our score will affect our contract, but they&#8217;re following the wrong firm. We have to tell them who we are and what [standards and certifications] we&#8217;ve got, because if we don&#8217;t, they&#8217;ll get the wrong picture.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;Do you not think you need to change the name of the business?&#8221; one wag asked, cheekily.</p>
<p>&#8220;We did!&#8221; came the resigned reply.</p>
<p>&#8220;This is an interesting point,&#8221; Dellow said. &#8220;People are trying to monitor their suppliers but they don&#8217;t necessarily have the right tools or resources to do it accurately.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;They&#8217;re chasing the minimum,&#8221; one leader argued. &#8220;They&#8217;re using scorecards to monitor the supply chain, and getting it wrong.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;I&#8217;m sorry,&#8221; another attendee responded, &#8220;but that&#8217;s their problem.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>Maybe, others acknowledged. However, as the security leader at the firm with the similarly named competitors noted: &#8220;It becomes ours.&#8221;</p>
<p>Dellow had some optimism to offer to this beleaguered CISO, and to any others who may find themselves in similar situations.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;We help end to end, and we come across companies like yours all the time,&#8221; she said. &#8220;The business will go out, pop a domain name in [to the scorecard system], not even validate that it&#8217;s the correct one. That shouldn&#8217;t be down to you to resolve, but it comes up again and again. The questionnaire [responses represent] very much a fixed point in time, so these tools do provide something; there is some value. But, a), it doesn&#8217;t flag if it&#8217;s the correct domain, and b) doesn&#8217;t tell you how the score is relevant to the service that provider supplies to you. That relationship between you and the vendor is unique. If we rely too much on these scores &#8211; just like if we rely too much on the questionnaires &#8211; there will be problems.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<h4><strong>How Hard Is It?</strong></h4>
<p>There is clearly much dissatisfaction, both with the tried-and-tested traditional questionnaire-based method of gathering an informational baseline about supplier security and compliance, and with some of the additional tools and techniques that have been developed to try to help expand upon that. Clearly there is a widespread need for something that goes beyond these most prevalent of extant approaches. Diligent believe they have a compelling product set to help the many businesses clearly struggling in this area, but talking about it, their staffers said, is a necessary, and positive, first step.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;We&#8217;re trying to solve those issues we&#8217;ve been circling round tonight,&#8221; Ryan said. &#8220;We built a platform that allows customers to monitor lots of different sources every minute, every day. Scorecards, but also the dark web, news forums &#8211; any place that could point to stress that would bring risk to your business. And then building a risk profile. We&#8217;re getting you to the point where you continuously monitor many, many different sets of data, and we help you proactively manage and mitigate risk.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>As to where these approaches may lead in the future, the discussion, Farrell said, had proved instructive.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;One of the most interesting things said here was that AI has helped,&#8221; he said. &#8220;I&#8217;m very critical and dubious about it, but I liked how we heard that it has got other groups within the business involved. The importance of the rest of the business being involved in third-party risk management &#8211; of it not just being a security problem &#8211; is vital. You need interest from the board, and if it&#8217;s just a security problem you don&#8217;t get resources, so we end up with it being just questionnaires.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;It&#8217;s clear no one approach works for everyone,&#8221; Dellow summed up. &#8220;We might all have similar roles, but we&#8217;re all in different businesses with different strategies. We&#8217;re all reliant on suppliers, and the questionnaires all look very different. And the risks are very different. We see more and more organisations looking to explore transparency on data provided, and how it&#8217;s validated. There are number of different ways of doing that but as we all grow and scale up it becomes more complex. Ultimately, you have to identify your biggest challenges, and how you can address them. We&#8217;d be more than happy to show you how we can help, but also to share what we&#8217;re hearing from other customers. We&#8217;re always happy to help connect the dots.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>The post <a href="https://rantcommunity.com/resources/time-to-settle-the-score-why-your-tprm-strategy-needs-more-than-questionnaires-and-tick-boxes/">Time To Settle The Score: Why Your TPRM Strategy Needs More Than Questionnaires And Tick-Boxes</a> appeared first on <a href="https://rantcommunity.com">RANT Community</a>.</p>
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		<title>Damage limitation mode engaged: How CISOs are managing agentic AI, one control at a time</title>
		<link>https://rantcommunity.com/resources/damage-limitation-mode-engaged-how-cisos-are-managing-agentic-ai-one-control-at-a-time/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Galena]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 25 Sep 2026 09:48:15 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Resources]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mimecast]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://rantcommunity.com/?p=3231</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>There was a time when insider threats moved at the speed of humans. When they were centred around relatively predictable</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://rantcommunity.com/resources/damage-limitation-mode-engaged-how-cisos-are-managing-agentic-ai-one-control-at-a-time/">Damage limitation mode engaged: How CISOs are managing agentic AI, one control at a time</a> appeared first on <a href="https://rantcommunity.com">RANT Community</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There was a time when insider threats moved at the speed of humans. When they were centred around relatively predictable individuals. And attribution and intent were fairly easy to discern. Unfortunately for CISOs, that era is fast receding. The one that comes to replace it will be more chaotic, more complex and potentially more dangerous.</p>
<p>Today, AI agents dominate discussion of insider risk. They’re unpredictable, resourceful and move at machine speed. Just witness the growing roll call of sandbox escapes and rogue attacks by frontier AI systems. If left unmanaged, the technology could open the door to significant financial, reputational and regulatory risks.</p>
<p>So what’s the answer? To find out more, Mimecast recently brought together a bunch of harried cybersecurity leaders for another fascinating RANT roundtable.</p>
<blockquote><p>“What we don’t know is the real challenge. Our ability to understand and visualise the data, have orchestration around data in motion, and know which humans are tethered to which agents,” argued Mimecast SVP EMEA, James Morgan. “Where is the balance between security and productivity? We want to make sure security teams don’t continue to have that reputation of blocking everything.”</p></blockquote>
<h4><strong>The bane of our lives</strong></h4>
<p>It was pretty clear from the outset of the discussion that there are no easy answers. One CISO described agentic AI as “the bane of my life”. Another admitted: “we’re in damage limitation mode”. A third said: “I’ve given up trying to pretend I know what’s going on.” Yet another attendee noted how difficult it is to “convey risk to stakeholders” when IT is often one step behind the business in understanding the scale of adoption across the enterprise.</p>
<p>Several CISOs round the table bemoaned this lack of visibility. How can security leaders be expected to manage the risks associated with agentic AI when they don’t even know the size of the problem? One government security boss estimated that there may be as many as one agent per employee, across a department of 18,000 workers.</p>
<blockquote><p>“My concern is we’re allowing it to create policy,” he said. “Would we be able to switch it off? We are watching from a distance as the world allows this thing to get out of control.”</p></blockquote>
<p>The risk is far from theoretical. One CISO explained that his team is already seeing advanced prompt injection attacks where threat actors are hiding malicious instructions in emails read by agents. Part of the risk stems from “permissions given to agents irresponsibly”, he argued. But it’s also down to attacker sophistication.</p>
<blockquote><p>“You think you have guardrails in place, but a clever chain of prompting can circumvent them,” he warned. “The prompts can be constructed in such a way that they create a narrative, spinning a story to the AI that works.”</p></blockquote>
<h4><strong>A message to vendors: step up or get lost</strong></h4>
<p>Threat actors should therefore take some of the blame for agentic AI risk. But the most ire on the night was reserved for the vendor community. Security leaders were particularly displeased at third-party SaaS products with AI baked in.</p>
<blockquote><p>“We have SaaS tools that look innocuous, but then vendors introduce AI capabilities we weren’t aware of,” said one. “You do your risk assessment but then it’s added at a later date.”</p></blockquote>
<p>The message was loud and clear: vendors must be more transparent about the AI they build into products, and pure-play AI makers must take on more responsibility for the security of their offerings.</p>
<blockquote><p>“They need to apply guardrails out of the box,” said one CISO. “I get that they want to push the envelope [with features]. But they’re effectively asking us to create guardrails. There needs to be a joint level of responsibility.”</p></blockquote>
<p>Another argued: “They often say ‘we don’t switch anything on by default because we don’t know your organisation. Well, they need to reconsider what is the default.”</p>
<p>Many were frustrated at the lack of industry regulation and accountability for frontier model makers. “There’s a big elephant in the room,” said one. “The guys who created the models haven’t created the guardrails.” However, a peer sitting opposite admitted that the tech is moving so fast that it’s almost impossible for regulators to keep up.</p>
<h4><strong>Just one more thing</strong></h4>
<p>Ever the optimist, Mimecast CMO, Adenike Cosgrove, asked the assembled cybersecurity leaders to name a single action they’re taking to secure AI.</p>
<p>Some said they have AI champions in their organisation that help to disseminate knowledge and best practice internally. Another claimed she has blocked all shadow deployments “so we know exactly how many agents we have”. A third said his team has put in place governance frameworks to slow down adoption and “arrest the proliferation of AI so we can address it”.</p>
<p>However, governance looks different to different CISOs and in different contexts. Another attendee on the night said they use DLP and allowlisting to manage risks related to LLM-powered chatbots. But that for the agents used by development teams it’s about focusing on permissions. And for third-party SaaS they use procurement as a way to move governance and risk management upstream.</p>
<blockquote><p>“You should be tracking usage rather than the tools themselves,” he said. “If use changes, it needs to go back through the approval process.”</p></blockquote>
<p>Yet another CISO said she’s putting more effort into explaining to the company the “what and why” of AI so business users better understand the risks. “Awareness and education is sometimes overlooked, but it’s so important,” she argued.</p>
<h4><strong>Rotting our brains and corrupting our youth</strong></h4>
<p>The night ended with a lengthy detour into whether AI is slowly eroding our attention span and critical thinking skills. Millennials squared off against Gen Z-ers. But bubbling under the surface was a tension familiar to most CISOs: if an organisation becomes too dependent on a specific technology, it is more exposed to potential failure, compromise or disruption.</p>
<blockquote><p>“What happens when AI is no longer a choice but is fully integrated everywhere?” asked one CISO. “We’re already there,” replied another fatalistically.</p></blockquote>
<p>It was left to Cosgrove to round off the discussion on a more positive note by explaining how vendors can help.</p>
<blockquote><p>“Someone has to enable an agent, put data into an LLM, or leverage a SaaS app,” she said. “We can tell you who’s doing what with AI, and how data is flowing through it.”</p></blockquote>
<p>That’s as good a foundation for effective governance as any, as we enter a new era of agentic risk.</p>
<h4>Mimecast secures humans, data &amp; AI to protect your work. To learn more, head to <a href="https://www.workprotected.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">www.workprotected.com</a></h4>
<p>The post <a href="https://rantcommunity.com/resources/damage-limitation-mode-engaged-how-cisos-are-managing-agentic-ai-one-control-at-a-time/">Damage limitation mode engaged: How CISOs are managing agentic AI, one control at a time</a> appeared first on <a href="https://rantcommunity.com">RANT Community</a>.</p>
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		<title>Caught in the headlights: how can CISOs manage a problem like agentic AI?</title>
		<link>https://rantcommunity.com/resources/caught-in-the-headlights-how-can-cisos-manage-a-problem-like-agentic-ai/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Galena]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 21 Sep 2026 09:08:53 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Resources]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[RecoAI]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://rantcommunity.com/?p=3221</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>CISOs have been managing a continually shifting technology landscape all their careers. It comes with the territory. But few could</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://rantcommunity.com/resources/caught-in-the-headlights-how-can-cisos-manage-a-problem-like-agentic-ai/">Caught in the headlights: how can CISOs manage a problem like agentic AI?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://rantcommunity.com">RANT Community</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>CISOs have been managing a continually shifting technology landscape all their careers. It comes with the territory. But few could argue that the speed of AI’s rise has been dizzying for many in the industry. <a href="https://www.pwc.co.uk/services/alliances/insights/real-change-agents-reimagining-business-with-agentic-ai.html">PwC reckons</a> 61% of CEOs are actively investing in the technology today, although the real figure is likely to be higher. Now the next stage in AI’s inexorable advance is here, and it’s making security leaders nervous.</p>
<p>Several of them gathered together for a RANT roundtable recently to discuss all things agentic AI.</p>
<blockquote><p>“I don’t think there’s a bigger, more impactful mainstream problem,” said Bob Horn, CRO of our hosts for the evening, Reco. “We’ve seen a lot of technology shifts, but I don’t think we’ve seen one move this fast with this much uncertainty for the world.”</p></blockquote>
<p>Horn opened proceedings by describing the three different ways that CISOs are responding to this disruption. First is the security leader who says, “I’m too old for this” and refuses to change. Second is the CISO who mistakenly believes that their current playbook will still be effective in managing agentic AI risk. And third is the one who understands that people, process and technology must change.</p>
<h4><strong>Can someone please turn the lights on?</strong></h4>
<p>Fortunately, no cybersecurity leaders around the table seemed to fall into the first category. Their mere attendance was proof of that. But there was a certain amount of despair on show at the speed, scale and complexity of the challenge.</p>
<p>Our speaker for the evening, IP Finance International CISO, Nick Jones, bemoaned the fact that cyber leaders increasingly seem out of the loop.</p>
<blockquote><p>“We have unsupervised interns; AI agents in charge of AI agents. It’s shadow IT on steroids,” he argued. “I need an inventory and I need visibility. I need the lights turned on.”</p></blockquote>
<p>Others agreed that visibility is a key challenge as agents begin proliferating in the enterprise. “We have internal AI, external AI and no doubt there’s shadow AI too,” said one.</p>
<p>Several others expressed alarm that the business is moving too quickly, but also that blocking their projects outright is not an option.</p>
<blockquote><p>“The problem is we’re back to the old days of the ‘department of no’,” said one. “We’ve become the speed bump again and that’s a difficult PR thing to manage.”</p></blockquote>
<h4><strong>Overprivileged and over here</strong></h4>
<p>Various views were shared as to why agentic AI poses such a threat to organisations. They boil down to: visibility, identity and connectivity. Reco’s Horn suggested that there may be tens of thousands of agents running in an enterprise, but only a small number have access to sensitive environments. That makes tracking and managing everything critically important. “Every agent could be a crown jewel,” he argued.</p>
<p>Others aired concerns about over-privileged agents, unmanaged plugins, and the potential for autonomous machines to cause irreversible damage.</p>
<blockquote><p>“The attack vectors haven’t fundamentally changed. It’s the speed and broadening of the attack surface that have,” said one CISO. “They can be profoundly dangerous if we don’t manage what they’re capable of doing.” Another agreed that the velocity of change is causing sleepless nights. “We’re not prepared for the aftermath,” they warned.</p></blockquote>
<p>One CISO raised a red flag over MCP. Having just got a handle on securely managing the organisation’s APIs, he fretted that the protocol could open up a new attack surface and route to data exfiltration.</p>
<h4><strong>Where resilience meets regulation</strong></h4>
<p>Several attendees shared their anxieties over regulatory scrutiny, and how the complexity of agentic environments makes it difficult to answer auditor’s questions.</p>
<blockquote><p>“They’ll ask you a simple question like ‘can you see what’s doing what?’ But you’ll need to connect to 25 different systems to give them an answer,” said one CISO.</p></blockquote>
<p>IP Finance International’s Jones explained that regulators are looking for better governance and monitoring; the latter because “guardrails you use today may need to look different tomorrow”. However, if those controls are too rigorous, “people will just work around them”, argued another attendee.</p>
<p>Others were sceptical about whether regulators are even sufficiently clued up to know what questions to ask.</p>
<blockquote><p>“Regulators want to address AI and quantum but they’re struggling with how they keep pace,” said one CISO. “The speed of regulation is actually slowing.”</p></blockquote>
<p>However, that doesn’t mean companies will be let off the hook. Jones confided that a recent regulatory letter had been “quite punchy”. He added: “they might not know what they’re looking for but they’re coming.”</p>
<p>As agentic projects expand, resilience is likely to be top of the agenda for auditors, Jones continued. Others around the table sounded the alarm around similar themes &#8211; such as what happens if critical business services come to rely on agents, but then underlying models change or are replaced by vendors.</p>
<h4><strong>Back to basics, to the future</strong></h4>
<p>Despite the general wringing of hands, some CISOs were bold enough to suggest some approaches to securely managing the growing agentic fleet in many enterprises. One advocated a “back-to-basics” approach, acknowledging that agentic AI amplifies existing risks rather than creates new ones.</p>
<blockquote><p>“In the cloud identity is everything-it’s your perimeter-and I think with AI it’s the same,” he said. “Fundamentally we need to go back to basics. Get your hygiene; sort your IAM.”</p></blockquote>
<p>However, Reco’s Horn pointed out that there are “toxic combinations” that may complicate this approach, citing the challenge of managing connected AI systems such as Copilot and Agentforce. In this way, one AI could expose data associated with another to attackers if not properly configured.</p>
<p>Others suggested a human in the loop was a useful approach, although some attendees warned that we’re fast approaching a time when the sheer volume of data and decisions presented to humans may make such a model unworkable.</p>
<p>Which brings us back to Reco’s Horn, who ended proceedings with a checklist for CISOs to work through. As a starting point, they need to understand what they have, who’s using it, what it’s connected to and what it’s doing, he said. Then comes the hard part: figuring out what to do about it.</p>
<p>As tough as today’s agentic environment is to manage, CISOs must also think about what’s coming down the track. “This is not a destination, this is a journey,” Horn concluded. “You’ve got to catch up. And whatever vendor you choose; buy for the future as well as the present.”</p>
<p dir="ltr"><span class="x_561081196highlight"><span class="x_561081196colour"><span class="x_561081196font"><span class="x_561081196size">See every agent. Know what it can reach. Fix the risk before it becomes an incident.</span></span></span></span></p>
<p dir="ltr"><span class="x_561081196highlight"><span class="x_561081196colour"><span class="x_561081196font"><span class="x_561081196size">Reco discovers every agent and identity across your environment, scores real risk instead of raw alert volume, and remediates by routing findings, scoping access, and revoking what shouldn&#8217;t exist. One platform, complete agent security. Demo Reco today [<a href="https://www.reco.ai/demo-request" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://www.reco.ai/demo-request</a>]</span></span></span></span></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://rantcommunity.com/resources/caught-in-the-headlights-how-can-cisos-manage-a-problem-like-agentic-ai/">Caught in the headlights: how can CISOs manage a problem like agentic AI?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://rantcommunity.com">RANT Community</a>.</p>
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		<title>Back To The Old School? Why Mapping Your Ancient Active Directory Might Be The Best Way Of Disrupting Novel Threats</title>
		<link>https://rantcommunity.com/resources/back-to-the-old-school-why-mapping-your-ancient-active-directory-might-be-the-best-way-of-disrupting-novel-threats/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Galena]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 16 Sep 2026 10:53:49 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Resources]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SpecterOps]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://rantcommunity.com/?p=3216</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Speed is an intriguing concept when we&#8217;re talking about cybersecurity. Firstly, whose pace should we be most concerned about? Is</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://rantcommunity.com/resources/back-to-the-old-school-why-mapping-your-ancient-active-directory-might-be-the-best-way-of-disrupting-novel-threats/">Back To The Old School? Why Mapping Your Ancient Active Directory Might Be The Best Way Of Disrupting Novel Threats</a> appeared first on <a href="https://rantcommunity.com">RANT Community</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Speed is an intriguing concept when we&#8217;re talking about cybersecurity. Firstly, whose pace should we be most concerned about? Is it the developers of new business-enabling digital tools, and the rate at which they go from being nice-to-haves to business-critical technologies? Is it the alacrity with which the organisation&#8217;s leaders rush to embrace developments that promise to enhance productivity and profitability, regardless of their impact on data security? Is it the breathless dashes through defences that attackers increasingly seem able to make, and how fast they can move laterally within the organisation&#8217;s carefully structured information silos? Or is it all of that and more &#8211; the relentless, unceasing waves of change, the ebb and flow of risk, and the fact that the average CISO has no means whatsoever of slamming on the brakes even if they knew which bit they wanted to try to slow down?</p>
<p>Sometimes, it seems, the best way to disrupt the most furiously focused and speed-enhanced attacks might be to return to some of the forgotten corners of the corporate network and take some time &#8211; not loads of it, either &#8211; to understand exactly what&#8217;s going on. This was the perhaps paradoxical lesson that leaped out of a recent RANT roundtable held in London where a selection of harried senior cybersecurity leaders engaged in a lively discussion with staff from SpecterOps. The company, which offers a wide range of security consultancy services, including Red Teaming and penetration testing, as well as the open-source and enterprise versions of a tool called BloodHound, has extensive experience working with some of the most demanding and technologically advanced organisations in the world.</p>
<p>When SpecterOps lets BloodHound off the leash in a large business, it romps through the active directory and worries away at the problem. It produces a graph, showing the myriad ways an attacker could move laterally, vertically and undetectably through the nodes of an organisation&#8217;s network. How shall they Pwn thee? BloodHound counts the ways. In one recently mapped financial-services giant &#8211; around four billion viable pathways that an attacker could use to reach the crown jewels. BloodHound doesn&#8217;t fix anything &#8211; but it shows users the pathways attackers could use, enabling network defenders to dynamite the road underneath an adversary&#8217;s digital army and deny them access to what they&#8217;re seeking.</p>
<h4><strong>Turbo Charged</strong></h4>
<p>In those businesses with huge numbers of attack paths, not only will many pass through the active directory, but most will be faster to travel down in organisations which give largely free rein for so-called &#8220;AI&#8221; agents to operate without direct human oversight or instruction. So it was little wonder that AI should surface very early in the evening&#8217;s discussion, as the advent of machine-speed automated tools has raised the stakes in identity and access control circles.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;We&#8217;ve got an early ringside seat to AI,&#8221; Mark Wilson, SpecterOps&#8217; senior sales engineer, told the gathering. &#8220;We&#8217;re building cyber ranges for Open AI, Anthropic, the UK AI institute. We&#8217;ve got access to models that haven&#8217;t been released yet. So we&#8217;ve had a lot of early insight into what that means.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>Largely, what it means is that everything &#8211; for good, or for ill &#8211; is happening faster.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;The principle of assume-breach has moved to a point of certainty &#8211; we&#8217;ve absolutely seen that,&#8221; he continued, referring to the mindset advocated in hitherto forward-leaning companies, to forget about keeping attackers out, and work out how to deal with them once they get inside. &#8220;The other thing is machine-speed lateral movement. All the high-profile companies who&#8217;ve been compromised in the last few months, they all have the latest EDR, they have their own SOC, 24-7 monitoring, and they still got hit really quickly.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>And this, he noted, is &#8211; if not always because of; but certainly increased by &#8211; the ways agentic AI systems work. To properly benefit from the machine-speed enhancements these tools and technologies promise, a business has to allow them to not just create and deploy agents autonomously: but to ensure that those agents are given access to the other parts of the system they need in order to carry out their promised functions. Even if a tool is working entirely benignly, and only carrying out the tasks its makers and users intend, the knock-on effect on access management is profoundly unsettling. New identities, created by automatic processes, authorised to access disparate parts of the corporate infrastructure, and not just operating but being created without any awareness from the security teams &#8211; it drives the proverbial coach and horses through most organisations&#8217; access-management processes. And once those are disrupted, disturbed, destroyed, then attackers will find it far easier not just to get in &#8211; because we know that they&#8217;re going to get in anyway &#8211; but to operate inside the enterprise without much danger of being discovered, never mind ejected.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;The thinking needs to change,&#8221; Wilson said. &#8220;The reason adversaries use identity is because it&#8217;s very difficult to pick up a signal you can respond to. We take the approach of not trying to have that fight. We change the focus. Our red team don&#8217;t use a single vulnerability, ever. It&#8217;s the quickest way to get picked up.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<h4><strong>Get Into Something</strong></h4>
<p>There were those in the room who seemed to still cling to the hope that some form of machine-speed agentic responses may help solve this burgeoning identity crisis. Though even those who voiced these thoughts did so in a way that implicitly acknowledged the almost magical thinking &#8211; or belief in the supernatural &#8211; that perhaps lies behind them.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;For me, if I had a magic wand&#8230;&#8221; one CISO began, before essaying a different analogy.</p>
<p>&#8220;Imagine you have a house and you keep building it,&#8221; they posited. &#8220;You keep on adding extensions. And if I want to know whether it leaks, I pour water over the top, and I see where it comes out. If I transfer that idea to IT, this is the policy area we&#8217;re supposed to be in. I&#8217;d love to have an AI agent based on that. Regardless of any access privileges, what should we have access to? The agent could help you determine which people shouldn&#8217;t have access, all based on the policy. So what I&#8217;m looking for, one day, is an application that can do that. Whether an identity is coming from AI, an API, a misconfiguration, won&#8217;t matter &#8211; if says you shouldn&#8217;t have access, so you don&#8217;t have access.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>Reactions to this proposal were ruminative, respectful, and reflective. But there was little sign of anyone in the room sharing any sincere belief that such a tool might soon exist.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;If you take away the hype around the Open AI breakout and the Hugging Face debacle, all this is about behaviour,&#8221; one security leader said. &#8220;Will we really be able to rely on policy when agents will work together, and find ways of circumventing policy? And will we ever get to a policy that&#8217;s that granular? When you&#8217;re issuing policies, a human is still making a decision about what&#8217;s right or wrong. You can set technical policy guardrails, but when you give an agent an objective, it&#8217;ll work out how to get around them.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;Agents don&#8217;t have the context,&#8221; said another leader, evidently struggling to balance optimism and cynicism but giving it a good go. In response to another attendee, who had noted that, in most contexts, access is conditional, this leader agreed: but wasn&#8217;t convinced this would ultimately make much difference to the challenges posed by agentic systems. &#8220;If you look at policy without conditions you&#8217;re probably playing 3D chess,&#8221; the suggested. &#8220;And the machine will be better at playing it than you are.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<h4><strong>Going Way Back</strong></h4>
<p>Perhaps, other attendees mused, the conversation &#8211; as so many in cybersecurity at the moment &#8211; had become dominated by AI concerns, when the nub of the matter was something more fundamental and less troublingly novel.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;We talk a lot about AI, but users are far better at circumventing things than agents,&#8221; they argued. &#8220;Of our top 100 users who are using things they shouldn&#8217;t, they&#8217;re not using AI to do them &#8211; they&#8217;re using platforms. Our backup has been around for so long, and no-one&#8217;s found a better solution. The requirement hasn&#8217;t changed, but the products haven&#8217;t matured. Some organisations now are looking at completely de-coupling identity [and considering it as] a completely separate layer: with the identity enabled for the service.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;When we talk about policy and zero-trust, those are what we think we&#8217;ve applied permissions to,&#8221; Wilson said. &#8220;We think of them as vertical silos &#8211; and when you look at them in a silo, they&#8217;re alright. But there&#8217;s integrations; and you move laterally through them. When you think about those silos, there are going to be collisions. When we&#8217;ve compromised clients, it&#8217;s where we&#8217;ve moved things over. The attacker lives in that space, and they don&#8217;t care about governance or policy.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>It&#8217;s a recipe for, if not disaster, then something seriously unappetising, as Wilson&#8217;s colleague, Europe, Middle East and Africa region sales director Colin Makin, pithily put it.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;It&#8217;s like cooking,&#8221; he said. &#8220;You can have the very best ingredients, but the meal may still end up being terrible.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>Stepping away from metaphor, Wilson sketched out a real-world example of how lateral movement through and between vertical silos can be conducted easily by adversaries, with devastating responses. His vignette came from some recent Red Team work with a large software vendor.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;They said, &#8216;We&#8217;ll give you a Git user account &#8211; do your worst&#8217;,&#8221; he recalled. &#8220;Their expectation was that we&#8217;d quickly get stuck, but that wasn&#8217;t the case at all. Just using that identity we were able to move into the Git repository, elevated our access, and within a short space of time, finding stuff that had been forgotten about, we&#8217;d gained control of their tenant and could have compromised 5,000 other organisations through a supply-chain attack. The reason we could do that is because everyone&#8217;s thinking about a least-privilege model. But the attacker&#8217;s mindset is: &#8216;If you give a non-human identity or an agent Slack access, what can it get to through those channels?'&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<h4><strong>Cold Gettin&#8217; Dumb</strong></h4>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;I think we&#8217;ve known this is a challenge for a very long time, and we&#8217;re always trying to chip away at it,&#8221; RANT&#8217;s guest host for the evening, Paul Griffiths, CISO of financial data and publishing business Delinean, said in his summation. &#8220;But it&#8217;s been bare bones, almost &#8211; just what we&#8217;ve needed to get through audits. Now, I think it&#8217;s become an insurmountable problem. We&#8217;ve used the old-school approach of doing policy and compliance, and increasingly we&#8217;re moving into activity monitoring. But AI is increasing the identity requirement. This is a real problem, not an invented problem.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>Underlining that assessment, Makin pulled few punches. The companies represented round the room ranged from relatively small to globally significant, yet were all experiencing these problems. None of these entities, he stressed, should feel as though they were on their own in this regard. SpecterOps&#8217; clients include giant firms whose products sit at the heart of the majority of the world&#8217;s digitally enabled businesses, and even <em>they</em> don&#8217;t really know how to respond.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;Microsoft are one of our biggest customers &#8211; they can&#8217;t solve the problem that AD has created,&#8221; he said. A chilling revelation, met with stunned silence &#8211; but help is at hand, he promised. BloodHound, he said, &#8220;is the cheat code. If your Blue Team uses it, they can get rid of not just the quickest routes, but all the routes.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>SpecterOps issued an open invitation to those around the table: let the firm loose in your active directory for a few hours, and BloodHound will lead your business to the sunlit uplands of cybersecurity heaven. Well, maybe not exactly &#8211; but they&#8217;ll at least promise to point you on your way.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;If you want to know how big the problem is, rather than taking the narrow view &#8211; this is what we do,&#8221; Wilson said.</p>
<p>&#8220;Give us the lowest identity possible, and an hour and a half, and we&#8217;ll show you how many attack paths you&#8217;ve got,&#8221; Makin added.</p>
<p>&#8220;If you want to find out what the risk looks like,&#8221; Wilson said, &#8220;let us know.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>The post <a href="https://rantcommunity.com/resources/back-to-the-old-school-why-mapping-your-ancient-active-directory-might-be-the-best-way-of-disrupting-novel-threats/">Back To The Old School? Why Mapping Your Ancient Active Directory Might Be The Best Way Of Disrupting Novel Threats</a> appeared first on <a href="https://rantcommunity.com">RANT Community</a>.</p>
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		<title>Don&#8217;t Fear The Future: How To Prepare For The Post-Quantum World</title>
		<link>https://rantcommunity.com/resources/dont-fear-the-future-how-to-prepare-for-the-post-quantum-world/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Galena]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 03 Aug 2026 09:10:29 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Resources]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[One Intelligence]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://rantcommunity.com/?p=3157</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>You&#8217;ve got to feel for the average (or even the well-above-average) cybersecurity leader. Assailed from all sides by threat actors</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://rantcommunity.com/resources/dont-fear-the-future-how-to-prepare-for-the-post-quantum-world/">Don&#8217;t Fear The Future: How To Prepare For The Post-Quantum World</a> appeared first on <a href="https://rantcommunity.com">RANT Community</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You&#8217;ve got to feel for the average (or even the well-above-average) cybersecurity leader. Assailed from all sides by threat actors turbocharged and enabled by large language model so-called &#8220;AI&#8221; tools, expected to achieve perfect defence of the enterprise and its crown-jewel data even against first-of-a-kind or hitherto unforeseeable attacks, they also have to ensure the company complies with a plethora of different security standards and, depending on the industry, state-mandated regulations. Like everyone else in the enterprise, they&#8217;re used to being told to &#8220;do more with less&#8221;, but to make matters worse, whenever they go to the board to ask for more money for tooling they believe is essential to carry out these missions successfully, they have a total absence of the definitive metrics that would help them make a business case &#8211; because in security, your most important statistic is the zero in the box that tallies the number of incidents the company has experienced.</p>
<p>So you could forgive the cyber leadership cohort if they&#8217;d maybe not got much remaining bandwidth to spend time planning for notional threats that may arise a year or two down the line. But the coming post-quantum world &#8211; in which quantum chips arrive in the commercial realm, exponentially increasing the computational power available to all kinds of miscreant, and in the process obliterating the encryption that secures data, connections and identities &#8211; is the kind of existential threat that no prudent security manager can afford to ignore. Even postponing thinking about it could leave CISOs open to criticism that they&#8217;d been guilty of dereliction of a core duty.</p>
<p>This is no idle concern. Today&#8217;s encryption standards are not based on perfect mathematical solutions, but on making the mathematical problems encryption relies on too difficult to solve using current computing capability. Quantum chips will reduce the time that would be required to solve those problems from centuries to seconds &#8211; meaning not only that access controls cease to provide any protection, but also that encrypted documents that might have been stolen in the past can be opened and read in the future.</p>
<p>But the post-quantum threat is difficult enough to wrap your head around even if you&#8217;re comfortable thinking about encryption, keys and quantum computing theory. Explaining to the board why they need to devote time, internal resource, and &#8211; likely &#8211; significant money <em>right now</em> to addressing a problem that may not start to bite for a few years is another matter entirely.</p>
<p>This, though, is where startup One Intelligence have decided to park their tanks. The company, founded by mathematicians and cryptographers, reckons it has a solution that will quantum-proof businesses, with minimal downside, no new kit, and no specialist cryptographic knowledge needed. And in the process, it will also solve some of the biggest challenges that are already being faced by networked businesses, and which are already understood &#8211; and budgeted for &#8211; by responsible corporate leaderships.</p>
<p>After deciding they were ready to emerge from stealth mode, the newly de-cloaked One made their first public pitch to cybersecurity professionals via a RANT roundtable held in London in mid-July. The ensuing discussion proved eye-opening, sobering and &#8211; perhaps &#8211; encouraging, in more or less equal measure.</p>
<h4><strong>Severed Crossed Fingers</strong></h4>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;I&#8217;d like to ask you, as we go through this tonight, that if you only remember one thing, it would be trust,&#8221; Brett Nakfoor, One&#8217;s global vice president of sales and marketing, said at the outset. &#8220;How do you solve for quantum, ransomware and AI attacks? Trust. We decided to solve the problem of quantum security &#8211; and we did, with a new class of math. We can mathematically prove that we can prevent quantum-computer and AI attacks. We are provably secure.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>Just as importantly, Nakfoor added, the solution One have come up with can be quickly and easily integrated into existing technology stacks and will not require customers to spin up new departments of specialist mathematicians, cryptographers or quantum experts to be able to successfully deploy it and manage it.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;We found out, luckily, that with this new math we could create a solution at the transport layer,&#8221; he explained. &#8220;Instead of putting security in afterwards, we decided to invert that. You can put more information into a packet, and deliver it all the way up from the transport layer &#8211; layer 3 &#8211; up to the human layer &#8211; level 7. But we&#8217;re all adding an eighth layer now &#8211; the AI agents.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>One&#8217;s concept solves that problem, too, Nakfoor said. The solution allows the user to &#8220;embed trust objects into an interaction before it starts,&#8221; he added.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;This opens up a whole new world of how you deliver solutions to your business,&#8221; he said. &#8220;What we&#8217;re positing is that we&#8217;ve commoditised the delivery of quantum security in our delivery of the software, and you can control all forms of AI in doing that. That&#8217;s a bold statement, but we&#8217;re happy to answer questions &#8211; and if you want to give us real-world examples, we&#8217;ll talk about how we can help fix them.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>What followed was an absorbing exercise in just that &#8211; as a high-level group of CISOs, BISOs and other senior security leaders outlined their current concerns and future fears, and, either directly or by implication, sought to discover how the One proposition might help them realign their businesses for this coming new world.</p>
<h4><strong>Pay Your Way In Pain</strong></h4>
<p>Rob Black, RANT&#8217;s host for the evening, opened up the discussion by asking attendees to describe the issues that were top-of-mind for them about post-quantum security. These early exchanges ran the gamut between immediate worries and long-term headaches, but also surfaced some scepticism over the extent to which specific companies or sectors might be exposed to certain dangers. As so often in cybersecurity, some argued, these ostensibly new and novel concerns may well just serve to remind organisations of the necessity of looking after some long-established basics.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;We have long-lived data, and shorter-lived data,&#8221; one security leader began. &#8220;If it&#8217;s only relevant and used for a short time then that&#8217;s OK &#8211; but we don&#8217;t have a solution for securing that long-lived data. We know we have to figure it out, but we don&#8217;t know how yet. And we don&#8217;t know how to work out how long that data might be of value to somebody.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;We&#8217;re tackling that question as well,&#8221; another attendee said. &#8221; It&#8217;s driven out of historic issues people have around data security. Without a decent understanding of what data you hold, and the metadata associated with it, you&#8217;d have a lot of work to do.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>There was also clear interest in one class of attack that, in a way, defies the passage of time. A patient attacker, able to identify data with a long useful lifespan, could steal or copy encrypted files now, and wait until quantum technology is available, and then decrypt it. Even businesses that may consider themselves to have little information that falls into that category may still have to consider it, as a third leader, whose company manufactures specialist physical devices, noted.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;Our own products are very cutting-edge technology &#8211; so we don&#8217;t have a massive issue [with harvest-now/decrypt-later] because the pace of change is very rapid: one of today&#8217;s blueprints, by the time you&#8217;ve figured out what to do with it, we&#8217;ve moved on,&#8221; they said. &#8220;However, our customers may take a different view. If they need to maintain their blueprints, those need to be retained securely for a very, very long time. So the data we collect for our customers is very important. And the moment you lose trust, the whole model evaporates.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<h4><strong>Hell Is Near</strong></h4>
<p>The issue of organisational or institutional awareness was also front-and-centre of mind for many in the room. Some felt the problem would be addressed in time, because a sense of urgency would emerge at corporate decision-making levels before too long, but organisations which tend to wait until they&#8217;re forced to change might struggle.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;Constantly having to explain the complexity of cryptography to the organisation is an issue,&#8221; one CISO said. &#8220;I think it&#8217;s an ongoing thing. Post-quantum will get everyone&#8217;s attention, from the CEO down, so everyone will be interested. Education goes hand in hand with it. I&#8217;m lucky enough to have a great crypto manager who manages this for us, but not everyone does. And &#8211; not wishing to tar everyone with the same brush &#8211; quite often those people who are good at crypto aren&#8217;t good at board presentations.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;We&#8217;ve got people whose job is post-quantum, and people who manage crypto &#8211; they understand it really well. But is the organisation ready to understand? No,&#8221; agreed another senior security leader.</p></blockquote>
<p>Black asked those around the table where they felt post-quantum security sat in their own, and their organisation&#8217;s, list of priorities. The first answer was, perhaps, a surprise.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;I was talking to someone from a regulator,&#8221; this security leader began. &#8220;They said it&#8217;s not a priority for them at the moment. There was a bunch of stuff they said we should be looking at, but they said that this isn&#8217;t in focus at the moment. Now, we don&#8217;t do things just because regulators tell us!&#8221; they laughed. &#8220;But it was an interesting observation.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>That good old favourite non-scientific data-gathering exercise &#8211; a quick show of hands &#8211; revealed that, among those in the room, no organisations currently viewed post-quantum security as their biggest concern, and a majority of those represented in the room worked for businesses which considered the threats posed by AI as their most urgent priority.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;The board&#8217;s got their hair on fire about it,&#8221; groaned one CISO. &#8220;At the moment, it&#8217;s all: &#8216;What are you doing about Mythos?'&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;A lot of board-level individuals can&#8217;t comprehend the impact post-quantum will have, but they can comprehend what AI can do,&#8221; another leader lamented. &#8220;It&#8217;s almost a race to the bottom &#8211; you must be doing better if you&#8217;re burning more tokens. Post-quantum is still abstract for them.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;It won&#8217;t be tangible until someone gets badly burned,&#8221; another agreed.</p></blockquote>
<h4><strong>Digital Witness</strong></h4>
<p>Mo Ali, One&#8217;s CEO, was peppered with questions about what One&#8217;s proposition entailed, how it worked, and where it ought to sit in security teams&#8217; thinking. He stressed that a key challenge has been that, to date, cryptographic standards have relied on the mathematical problems inherent in them being too difficult for current computing capabilities to crack, whereas One&#8217;s approach has been not just to make the maths difficult to solve, but to ensure there is a known solution. Some attendees expressed concerns that, perhaps, One were seeking to alter some of the fundamentals on which current cryptographic solutions are based, but Ali was quick to correct this. The company isn&#8217;t changing anything, he argued: instead, they are &#8220;gluing things together.&#8221;</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;The formal definition of &#8216;hardness&#8217; is the problem,&#8221; he said. &#8220;We say, &#8216;This cipher can&#8217;t be broken because computing is not strong enough,&#8217; then a couple of years later we say it can be broken. We&#8217;re defining post-quantum in a different way to what [U.S.-based standards body] NIST has done, but we&#8217;re still relying on the same fundamentals.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>Expanding on the point, he explained a little further about the approach the firm has taken. The company&#8217;s founders include people with backgrounds in quantitative trading, and some of their approach flows from that world.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;The quants said we need to rely on math,&#8221; Ali said, &#8220;but in cryptography, we don&#8217;t have quantitative cryptography. We need to know the force required to break it. Mathematically deterministic cryptography is harder, but that’s what we do. For years we&#8217;ve been using 128-bit blocks to encrypt &#8211; that means that the more we encrypt, the larger the keys, and the larger the key-management systems you need. We can encrypt an entire object &#8211; a database, a data centre &#8211; in one go. We made a programmable handshake, and we can embed policies in that handshake. We&#8217;re calling it Generative Trust Infrastructure.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>The terminology is important. Security specialists have long been aware of the concept of Zero Trust &#8211; and how difficult (if not impossible) it is to implement in any complete way. Generative Trust, ask Nakfoor pointed out, solves the problems Zero Trust implies because the &#8220;trust&#8221; element is &#8220;generated&#8221; at the inception, and baked in to the data at the point where it is created. And this means that the solution will work for agents created by AI tools, and every other entity or process, be it human or non-human.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;Machines have their own language, which is code,&#8221; Ali said. &#8220;Because we come from the high-frequency trading space, we really care about where information pops out for the first time. When it forms, we&#8217;re sitting there. That&#8217;s the intelligence part. You can&#8217;t solve Zero Trust because it&#8217;s assumption-based. We call it Generative Trust, because it&#8217;s generating trust across interactions.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>And by making it programmable &#8211; and easy to program &#8211; the company believes it has a solution not just to the post-quantum challenge, but to a host of current information-security problems, including securing AI systems and combatting ransomware.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;With a Generative Trust infrastructure, you can program &#8216;This is what I can do with this object&#8217;,&#8221; Nakfoor said. &#8220;If you&#8217;ve sent a document to me, I either obey your instructions [embedded in the document] or it isn&#8217;t usable. We can ensure it&#8217;s sent to the right person: you think you&#8217;re sending to me, but it goes to someone else &#8211; they wouldn&#8217;t be able to open the document because they don&#8217;t have the authorisation.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;What we&#8217;re doing is building the world&#8217;s first foundational crypto model at the transport layer,&#8221; Ali explained. &#8220;It&#8217;s almost like an LLM &#8211; you can communicate with it using a prompt. You can write a command in plain English. If you have an AI at the application layer, and you want to encrypt all your databases, while leaving one cluster alone &#8211; just writing that prompt does it. You can create your own instructions. It controls LLMs in a formal, proofed way. It doesn&#8217;t hallucinate, or have the limits LLMs have. You can use version controlling, and encrypt infrastructure in real time.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>The post <a href="https://rantcommunity.com/resources/dont-fear-the-future-how-to-prepare-for-the-post-quantum-world/">Don&#8217;t Fear The Future: How To Prepare For The Post-Quantum World</a> appeared first on <a href="https://rantcommunity.com">RANT Community</a>.</p>
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		<title>Speak Ya Clout: Straight-Shooting CISOs Trade Real Talk On AI Security With Cisco</title>
		<link>https://rantcommunity.com/resources/speak-ya-clout-straight-shooting-cisos-trade-real-talk-on-ai-security-with-cisco/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Galena]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 27 Jul 2026 09:30:39 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Resources]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cisco]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://rantcommunity.com/?p=3140</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Language is important. Understanding depends on having a shared frame of reference, and in a field like cybersecurity &#8211; littered</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://rantcommunity.com/resources/speak-ya-clout-straight-shooting-cisos-trade-real-talk-on-ai-security-with-cisco/">Speak Ya Clout: Straight-Shooting CISOs Trade Real Talk On AI Security With Cisco</a> appeared first on <a href="https://rantcommunity.com">RANT Community</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Language is important. Understanding depends on having a shared frame of reference, and in a field like cybersecurity &#8211; littered with acronyms, buzzwords, marketing hype and nerdy tech-speak &#8211; communicating critically important ideas requires practitioners, leaders and rank-and-file members of every organisation to be able to speak clearly to one another if problems are ever going to be solved. And at RANT events, we&#8217;re always keen to encourage plain speaking: the more down-to-earth the words used, the less chance there is of anyone missing the point.</p>
<p>But still, sometimes the community can surprise us. Such was the case with one &#8211; notably droll &#8211; contributor to a discussion convened in Manchester by Cisco, who were keen to hear about the challenges organisations are dealing with around adoption of so-called artificial intelligence. It was very early in the evening, and RANT&#8217;s guest host &#8211; Nnamdi Ozonma, information security officer for the UK and Nordic regions at Bilfinger &#8211; had asked what seemed a fairly innocuous, get-the-ball-rolling question. Among those businesses represented around the table that had chosen to adopt AI tools, did their security leaders feel that the organisation had also adopted suitable controls?</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;We&#8217;re currently in a phase we call &#8216;f&#8212;ing around and finding out&#8217;,&#8221; our admirably relaxed CISO reported. There was, of course, a chorus of barking laughter &#8211; but, just as evident, a widespread sense of rueful identification with the sentiment, even if the rest of the attendees may have phrased the response somewhat differently.</p>
<p>&#8220;It&#8217;s moving so fast, and it&#8217;s so new, that the only way to know how to secure it is to use it and work it out,&#8221; the f-bomb detonator continued. They represented a company with a series of semi-autonomous internal divisions, each able to set its own individual risk-acceptance/risk-avoidance levels, but with one shared security team and a single board overseeing everything. This puts our friend in a somewhat invidious position.</p>
<p>&#8220;The mandate across everything is &#8216;We should use AI and we have to adopt it&#8217;,&#8221; they said of the edicts issued across the organisation by the board. &#8220;It&#8217;s measured, and we&#8217;re trying to put guardrails in place. We&#8217;re letting staff use AI to help with their jobs, but not to export files. To find out how we can benefit, we have to use it.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>This early insight proved to be a key theme of an involving and wide-ranging hour of robust dialogue. How do you securely deploy a technology you can&#8217;t understand the security implications of until after you deploy it? But &#8211; spoiler alert! &#8211; it will come as little surprise to anyone who&#8217;s been watching the AI security picture evolve that even as high-level and highly experienced a group as the baker&#8217;s dozen CISOs, BISOs and other senior security leaders were unable to unpick this particular Gordian knot.</p>
<h4><strong>Who&#8217;s Gonna Take The Weight?</strong></h4>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;There&#8217;s so much enthusiasm from the higher echelons to use it and benefit from it, so experimentation is what we&#8217;re all having to do,&#8221; another security leader agreed. &#8220;But has anyone actually done what you would do if you were carrying out a scientific experiment, which would be to set a hypothesis and then test it?&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>Not yet, was the widespread answer. And this revealed another, underlying, potentially more subtly disturbing, conundrum: the benefits of AI deployment are assumed to be so significant that those deployments are not only arriving without tested hypotheses to confirm security, but without even any metrics by which to assess the expected benefits. Board-level FOMO means staff are being encouraged to use AI tools to develop agents to carry out tasks in the hope that benefits will accrue &#8211; but without being given a framework against which success can be measured.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;I think  the issue at the moment is people have a solution but not a problem,&#8221; another CISO argued. &#8220;There&#8217;s the drive, the push, but the use case isn&#8217;t there. What are we building these agents for? What are the guardrails? What are the outcomes?&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>It isn&#8217;t just the benefits that aren&#8217;t quantified yet, either &#8211; the risks, crucially, are often yet to be adequately assessed, or limits placed on their acceptability.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;How are we quantifying what&#8217;s going wrong? Ozonma asked. &#8220;Is it security incidents? Operational value is tangible,&#8221; he added, but the implication of the opposite was clear: if security&#8217;s success is measured by absence of incidents, then it&#8217;s not provable or demonstrable. And when the tools are changing and evolving at such rapid pace, even a successful attempt at conducting such measurements risks being out of date before it&#8217;s ready to report internally.</p></blockquote>
<p>Another option, one CISO argued, is to take a step back from trying to implement technical controls, and to look instead to shore up the organisation on  a more deeply embedded, cerebral level.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;I wouldn&#8217;t go for technical controls,&#8221; they said. &#8220;I&#8217;d want to enhance our culture around use of AI. If you can build a secure culture in how your staff engage with AI, then when things move and change, the culture should give you some measure of protection. It&#8217;s harder to build a culture than to write a policy, but that&#8217;s where I&#8217;d want to spend the money. If you build a culture, you&#8217;ll get much more benefit and far fewer problems.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<h4><strong>Soliloquy Of Chaos</strong></h4>
<p>Technical controls and pragmatic, use-case-specific restrictions can, of course, be put in place by individual businesses, divisions or departments. These may help to limit risk, although they may also restrict benefits. The trouble, attendees seemed to mostly agree, is there&#8217;s no way of knowing in advance where the most prudent place to draw those lines might be. A lack of advice from governments, regulators and other central sources of knowledge and expertise was cited as an issue here &#8211; only for one CISO to push back on the assertion.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;I&#8217;m going to disagree that there&#8217;s no standard advice,&#8221; they argued. &#8220;There is: there&#8217;s governance. It&#8217;s not perfect, and people are often fumbling in the dark. Two years ago it was true that there were no guardrails, but we&#8217;ve come a long way since then.</p>
<p>&#8220;We&#8217;ve got standards we&#8217;ve been working with for decades that will work with this,&#8221; they continued. &#8220;We just have to find out where the gaps are. If we focus on those deltas we&#8217;ll get value from our human decision-making.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;There&#8217;s some frameworks, and there are some flaws,&#8221; another security leader (partly) agreed. The problem, they suggested, was making sure those frameworks were understood throughout the business, and could be applied uniformly and consistently. The reason this rarely happens is no real surprise: it&#8217;s because this technology has users &#8211; who, being human, tend to resist being shoved into a limited number of restrictive categories.</p>
<p>&#8220;We think we&#8217;ve got three types of users,&#8221; this leader continued. &#8220;There are ones who go, &#8216;We&#8217;ve got to use AI now!&#8217; And then you ask them, &#8216;What do you want to use it for? And they say, &#8216;Don&#8217;t know!&#8217; Then there&#8217;s those who want to use it to speed up their basic daily tasks. But it&#8217;s the third type that are the big headache. We used to have colleagues making bonkers decisions but having to go through gatekeepers &#8211; and now they&#8217;ve got tools they can use to go out and do those bonkers things invisibly.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>Regulations, frameworks and best-practice guidance do exist, Cisco&#8217;s solutions engineering manager, Bradley Rossi, noted: but they don&#8217;t apply in all instances, and even in the scenarios where they do notionally have an impact, there are gaps.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;There are things like the European Union AI Act,&#8221; he acknowledged, &#8220;but there are complete sectors where it doesn&#8217;t apply &#8211; like healthcare. It&#8217;s scary. People want to use AI because it&#8217;ll cut waiting lists and get faster first opinions on the results of CT scans &#8211; so there&#8217;s a push from the public to use it, but no set framework to specify what you&#8217;re allowed to do.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;It&#8217;s true,&#8221; another veteran security leader lamented. &#8220;People have had the opportunity to learn, but in my experience, a lot of them haven&#8217;t.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;A lot of people who are in positions where they could show leadership haven&#8217;t learned,&#8221; another CISO said. &#8220;They&#8217;re saying, &#8216;We must use AI&#8217; and have charged ahead because of what it might deliver, without clearly defining anything, and whilst often shutting down discussion of possible risks.</p>
<p>&#8220;Virtually everyone I know who works in a private company who has engaged with AI has a story of someone in their organisation who has done something really bad with it,&#8221; they added. &#8220;Often it gets caught; sometimes it doesn&#8217;t, but things get smoothed over. But everyone I know in a private company knows someone in that position &#8211; and that tells me this problem is widespread.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<h4><strong>Moment Of Truth</strong></h4>
<p>Cisco doesn&#8217;t have a whizz-bang AI-security solution it&#8217;s trying to sell. Rossi and his colleague, technical solutions specialist Regan Newman, were keen to highlight the operating concept they call UZTNA &#8211; universal zero-trust network access. The last four letters of that acronym &#8211; what Rossi calls &#8220;the low-hanging fruit&#8221; &#8211; is stuff that most businesses already do, or try to do. Universalising it, though, &#8220;really does change the game,&#8221; he argued.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;With non-human identities involved, and with nation-state interest in some of your intellectual property, you need to be really sure what permissions you&#8217;re giving these agents,&#8221; Rossi said.</p>
<p>&#8220;The whole idea isn&#8217;t new,&#8221; Newman added. &#8220;ZTNA isn&#8217;t one thing you can achieve &#8211; you don&#8217;t suddenly say, &#8216;Hey, I&#8217;m ZTNA-compliant.&#8217; You need to work out what zero-trust means in your environment, and what your priorities are.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>Several businesses represented in the room were somewhere on their ZTNA journey, but the zero-trust element appeared to be tripping some of them up.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;I think it&#8217;s an impossible target,&#8221; one leader said. &#8220;We can&#8217;t get over the line on being perfectly zero-trust. We have very tight controls and we&#8217;ve done pretty well in red-team exercises, but it&#8217;s not perfect.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;It&#8217;s a myth that you can every achieve 100% perfect zero trust,&#8221; another leader agreed. A short discussion followed about what achieving perfect zero trust actually means.</p>
<p>&#8220;I think it means that we have a fair level of trust that in most situations, zero trust is going to be effective,&#8221; one leader said, carefully. &#8220;We have mostly effective controls &#8211; by which I mean, our controls are fully effective in most situations. We rely on technological, governance and cultural controls. But there&#8217;ll always be things that slip between those.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;It&#8217;s best endeavours, isn&#8217;t it?&#8221; another CISO suggested.</p>
<p>&#8220;Exactly,&#8221; Ozonma agreed. &#8220;It&#8217;s based on the risk tolerance within your organisation. Tomorrow it&#8217;s going to change. As security professionals, our job is to consistently make sure we&#8217;re providing that level of assurance. Fundamentally, everything we do is based on risk management. Is it acceptable, tolerable, or a flat-out &#8216;No&#8217;?&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>Which seemed to bring us back to where we came in, and the need to experiment. Also, Newman suggested, the need to share the results of those experiments.</p>
<blockquote><p>   &#8220;Don&#8217;t let this knowledge be kept exclusive,&#8221; he said. &#8220;Leverage each others&#8217; experience: there&#8217;s lots of lessons to learn. That f&#8212;ing around and finding out? There&#8217;s plenty that can be learned from that experience.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>The post <a href="https://rantcommunity.com/resources/speak-ya-clout-straight-shooting-cisos-trade-real-talk-on-ai-security-with-cisco/">Speak Ya Clout: Straight-Shooting CISOs Trade Real Talk On AI Security With Cisco</a> appeared first on <a href="https://rantcommunity.com">RANT Community</a>.</p>
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		<title>AI Security: Control, Chaos, or Catch-Up?</title>
		<link>https://rantcommunity.com/resources/ai-security-control-chaos-or-catch-up/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Galena]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 08:17:22 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Resources]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cybanetix/Noma]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://rantcommunity.com/?p=3114</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>AI is moving from personal experimentation to enterprise-wide adoption at pace. However, security strategies are reportedly struggling to keep up.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://rantcommunity.com/resources/ai-security-control-chaos-or-catch-up/">AI Security: Control, Chaos, or Catch-Up?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://rantcommunity.com">RANT Community</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>AI is moving from personal experimentation to enterprise-wide adoption at pace. However, security strategies are reportedly struggling to keep up.</p>
<p>At a recent roundtable held in Manchester on the hottest day of the year, attendees were asked why they had come along, and the responses reflected the wide range of concerns organisations currently have around AI:</p>
<ul>
<li>See use of AI across estates, do assurance and help people understand risks</li>
<li>Squeeze AI into everything, consider what to give access to</li>
<li>Everyone wants to use AI, but have optimistic dread</li>
<li>We are implementing it</li>
<li>Worried AI will replace jobs; my job is to make sure there is assurance</li>
<li>Concerned about what employees and contractors do with AI</li>
<li>How can I use AI for what I do, while managing, protecting and defending against AI threats?</li>
<li>How everyone else approaches AI adoption and deals with access requests</li>
</ul>
<p>Opening the discussion, Merlin Gillespie, director at Cybanetix, said there is a vested interest in securing technology, which is difficult enough, while also developing policies that encourage innovation. Meanwhile, Tim Gibbs, director of sales for EMEA at Noma Security, said he was relatively new to the security space but had spoken to hundreds of organisations about AI adoption and the security challenges they face every day. &#8220;We strive to keep up with the agents of change,&#8221; he said.</p>
<p>He noted that AI adoption continues to rise, although organisations are at very different stages of maturity. Some are well advanced, while others are only beginning their AI journey, yet all are faced with managing hundreds, if not thousands, of AI agents.</p>
<p>Chair Rob Black asked the table where they were with AI adoption. One attendee said they were trying to &#8220;wrap guardrails&#8221; around AI while running at &#8220;1,000mph&#8221;, while others commented that they did not want to stifle innovation but instead wanted to understand how to control AI while continuing to use the models available.</p>
<p>Others observed that some organisations simply &#8220;want to be the first to do everything and implement it&#8221;, while another attendee questioned who is responsible when AI does something unexpected.</p>
<p>The discussion centred on the theme that AI is moving from experimentation to enterprise-wide adoption at pace, but security strategies are struggling to keep up, with many organisations still grappling with what that means in practice.</p>
<h4><strong>Restrict and Manage Risk</strong></h4>
<p>Moving the discussion on, Black asked how organisations can define and manage their risk appetite without simply restricting AI altogether.</p>
<p>The conversation quickly turned to how AI is being used, whether internally or externally, and the implications of what external tools can ingest and what internal tools may inadvertently disclose. One attendee described AI as &#8220;the Wild West&#8221;, suggesting that some organisations are willing to be first movers, while others are happy to accept the associated risks.</p>
<p>Another attendee argued that business leaders are under pressure but are not necessarily discussing AI strategically. Instead, CIOs and CTOs are expected to improve productivity, while CISOs are expected to remain cautious, restrictive and sensible.</p>
<p>Others noted that developers are already downloading and training models, with several admitting to using tools such as Claude and Gemini. One attendee explained that AI had already helped respond to client audit requests and could &#8220;chop time from the process&#8221;.</p>
<p>The discussion highlighted a familiar dilemma: restrict AI and risk falling behind, or open the floodgates and attempt to retrofit controls later. Alongside this are the practical challenges of preventing sensitive data leakage, securing AI models themselves and enforcing policy-driven controls.</p>
<p>This is why there needs to be a broader conversation about the real challenges behind AI security in modern enterprises, cutting through market noise to explore practical approaches that enable organisations to use public AI securely.</p>
<p>Another attendee argued that organisations should learn from history. They pointed out that industries have successfully introduced controls around mobile banking, cloud computing and internet usage, so there is no need to overcomplicate AI governance. Instead, organisations should build on the controls and lessons that already exist.</p>
<p>Gillespie added that the pace of change has accelerated dramatically over the past five years and that AI is now approaching a tipping point. Organisations can almost guarantee they are using AI every day, yet the speed of adoption remains difficult to measure.</p>
<p>Others described AI as &#8220;more of a black box&#8221;, questioning what happens inside the models and whether they can truly be trusted.</p>
<h4><strong>How Do You Use It?</strong></h4>
<p>Asked by Black how organisations are using AI today, one attendee said behavioural AI can monitor business activity, identify anomalies and alert users. AI can then summarise those alerts, providing context around what constitutes normal behaviour.</p>
<p>Another attendee said AI can provide an overview of key information and help pull together sources, allowing users to generate an initial statement or draft much more quickly. However, everyone agreed that there must always be a human element involved.</p>
<p>On the subject of trust, Black asked where attendees were in their AI journey. One participant said they had no inherent trust in AI and instead approached it with a &#8220;zero trust&#8221; mindset, reviewing and understanding each tool before deployment. Without properly assessing and accepting the risks, they argued, users would inevitably find ways around the controls.</p>
<p>Another attendee said the situation is made more complicated because every AI platform is different, with no standardised set of effective controls that organisations can consistently apply.</p>
<p>Others noted that mapping AI outputs back to existing security controls requires considerable time and effort. While AI can often complete tasks faster than an individual, it is only trustworthy when organisations understand how it arrived at its conclusions and can validate the results.</p>
<p>Another attendee said AI often falls down on explainability. Organisations need to be able to ask why an AI made a particular decision and determine whether its reasoning can be trusted. AI models require tuning, and anyone expecting immediate results should instead expect improvements over several months.</p>
<p>Ultimately, one attendee concluded that organisations should embrace AI and innovate with it, but treat anyone using generative AI as if they were a developer.</p>
<h4><strong>Who Owns AI?</strong></h4>
<p>In the final section, Black asked who is driving AI adoption within organisations.</p>
<p>The discussion focused on how organisations are structuring ownership, including whether responsibility for AI security should sit with the CISO or whether new roles, such as Chief AI Officer, are beginning to emerge.</p>
<p>One attendee said the pressure comes from two directions: CEOs looking to improve workflows and software developers eager to adopt AI as quickly as possible.</p>
<p>Another argued that organisations should first identify where AI genuinely delivers efficiencies and assess whether it is appropriate for each team. They also stressed the importance of understanding where AI provides value, where it does not, and communicating those decisions in business language.</p>
<p>Others said organisations must determine who the users are, how AI will improve their work and why it should be used in the first place. One attendee suggested that many boards see AI as a panacea, failing to understand its limitations and associated risks. Instead, there is an expectation that AI will simply make everything better, and organisations are often expected to deliver on that belief.</p>
<p>Concluding the discussion, Gillespie said there is ultimately a question of trust: organisations need to get more value out of AI than they put into it, while ensuring a human remains involved. He admitted that &#8220;the world moves on&#8221; and described this as &#8220;the most interesting time in the technology landscape&#8221;. Regardless of whether AI proves to be wholly good or bad, he said, it is certainly interesting.</p>
<p>Gibbs said he had listened closely to the discussion around leveraging AI within the SOC, particularly the points raised around trust, data security and the rise of agentic AI. He stressed that he was not dismissing the technology, but organisations need to understand which AI agents are legitimate, what capabilities they have and how they are being used.</p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;The only thing is no one knows where we&#8217;re going,&#8221; he said. Although he personally vets everything AI produces, he concluded that it is &#8220;fantastic&#8221; and that he &#8220;cannot live without it&#8221;.</p></blockquote>
<p>The post <a href="https://rantcommunity.com/resources/ai-security-control-chaos-or-catch-up/">AI Security: Control, Chaos, or Catch-Up?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://rantcommunity.com">RANT Community</a>.</p>
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